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FIREARMS, EXTREME RISK, AND LEGAL DESIGN: “RED FLAG”
LAWS AND DUE PROCESS
Joseph Blocher* & Jacob D. Charles**
Extreme risk protection order (“ERPO”) laws—often called “red flag”
laws—permit the denial of firearms to individuals who a judge has
determined present an imminent risk of harm to themselves or others.
Following a wave of adoptions in the wake of the Parkland murders,
such orders are now authorized by law in nineteen states and the
District of Columbia and under consideration in many others.
Advocates argue that they provide a tailored, individualized way to
deter homicide, suicide, and even mass shootings by providing a tool
for law enforcement or others to intervene when harm appears
imminent, without having to wait for injury, lethality, or criminal
actions to occur. But the laws have also garnered criticism and have
become a primary target of the Second Amendment sanctuary
movement.
As a matter of constitutional law, the most serious questions about
ERPO laws involve not the right to keep and bear arms but due process.
Such orders—like domestic violence restraining orders, to which they
are often compared—can initially be issued ex parte, and critics often
allege that this feature (and others including the burden of proof) raises
constitutional problems.
This Article provides a comprehensive analysis of the applicable due
process standards and identifies the primary issues of concern. It
concludes that, despite some variation, current ERPOs generally
satisfy the relevant standards. It also notes those features that are likely
to give rise to the strongest challenges. The analysis both builds on and
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suggests lessons for other areas of regulation where laws are designed
so as to lessen extreme risk.
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INTRODUCTION
What process is due when people who pose an extreme risk of harm to
themselves or others are temporarily deprived of a constitutional right?
What design choices can legislators make to ensure that such deprivations
provide constitutionally adequate protections?
Although such questions have arisen in many different contexts,
including domestic violence restraining orders and civil commitments,
they are now front and center for what is arguably the most important
current development in firearms regulation: the spread of “extreme risk”
or “red flag” laws that permit courts to order that firearms be temporarily
removed from individuals who pose an imminent risk of harm to
themselves or others. Advocates see these laws as an effective, targeted
way to save lives while respecting the Second Amendment.1 Critics allege
that they amount to “pre-crime” punishment and that they violate not only

1

See infra Section I.A.
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the right to keep and bear arms but also the due process guarantee.2 In
fact, opposition to extreme risk laws has helped fuel the “Second
Amendment sanctuary” movement, by which some local governments
have pledged their refusal to enforce state and federal gun laws.3
Behind the political claims lies an enormously important and difficult
set of questions regarding the ways in which the law can be
constitutionally designed to account for risky-but-not-criminal behavior.
Judges and scholars have long recognized that laws regulating on the basis
of future risk raise a different and in many ways harder set of questions
than those that, for example, punish prior behavior.4 On the one hand, the
law often restricts behavior on the basis of predictions. Even basic costbenefit analysis—which is foundational to the regulatory state5—is
largely forward-looking. Regulation of risk, in short, is nothing new.6
But when such regulation intersects with constitutional rights and
interests in the absence of a criminal conviction or its equivalent, harder
questions arise about the necessary procedures and evidentiary burdens.
Intuitively, restraining a person who has harmed others is different from
restraining someone who is only at risk of doing so. There is no bright
line: civil commitments, restraining orders, and the like all impose

2 See infra note 159 and accompanying text (“pre-crime” comparison); infra notes 81–88
and accompanying text (Second Amendment critique); infra notes 29–30 (due process
critique).
3 Noah Shepardson, America’s Second Amendment Sanctuary Movement Is Alive and
Well, Reason (Nov. 21, 2019, 4:00 PM), https://reason.com/2019/11/21/americassecond-amendment-sanctuary-movement-is-alive-and-well/ [https://perma.cc/XKV7-ADF4];
see also Scott Pelley, A Look at Red Flag Laws and the Battle Over One in Colorado, 60
Minutes, CBS News (Nov. 17, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/red-flag-gun-laws-astandoff-in-colorado-60-minutes-2019-11-17/ [https://perma.cc/GF5D-BSH2] (examining
Second Amendment sanctuaries in Colorado).
4 Both categories, of course, may well be based on prior behavior—in the former set, that
behavior is evidence of future risk; in the latter, it is the basis for retribution or some other
governmental interest.
5 See Richard L. Revesz & Michael A. Livermore, Retaking Rationality: How Cost-Benefit
Analysis Can Better Protect the Environment and Our Health 9–10 (2008) (noting that the use
of cost-benefit analysis has been a contentious issue in regulatory policy making for decades);
Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit Revolution 3–4, 6–7 (2018) (describing how successive
Presidents since Ronald Reagan have required that regulations promulgated during their
administrations be justified on a cost-benefit basis).
6 Nor, for that matter, is the notion that regulation often involves trading off one risk against
another: denying a firearm to a particular person might lower the risk that he will misuse it,
while raising the risk that he will be unable to defend himself in a time of need. For an
influential analysis of the tradeoff question, see Risk Versus Risk: Tradeoffs in Protecting
Health and the Environment 3–5 (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995).
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significant restraints in an effort to prevent future harms and are not
categorically unconstitutional. Scholars have explored those related
contexts7 but have only recently devoted attention to these questions in
the context of extreme risk laws,8 and this Article is the first to provide an
in-depth examination of the due process issues they raise. (These are often
called “red flag” laws, though that label might convey a stigma, so we
will use the increasingly common “extreme risk” label.9)
In the past two years alone, a dozen states have adopted or expanded
such laws. Although the details vary, their form is similar: law
7 For a sampling of the literature regarding involuntary commitments for mental illness, see
David L. Bazelon, Institutionalization, Deinstitutionalization and the Adversary Process, 75
Colum. L. Rev. 897, 899–900 (1975) (asking “[i]s confinement on the basis of
‘dangerousness’ alone constitutional?” and providing a skeptical answer); Veronica J.
Manahan, When Our System of Involuntary Civil Commitment Fails Individuals with Mental
Illness: Russell Weston and the Case for Effective Monitoring and Medication Delivery
Mechanisms, 28 Law & Psych. Rev. 1, 32 (2004) (“Civil liberty concerns, as evidenced by
the extensive due process protections afforded to those facing involuntary commitment, and
the state’s interest in protecting all of its citizens, are fundamentally at odds.”); Alexander
Tsesis, Due Process in Civil Commitments, 68 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 253, 300–01 (2011)
(arguing that civil commitment should require a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of
proof).
Scholars have also explored due process protections as they apply to domestic violence
restraining orders (“DVROs”) and similar legal restrictions. See, e.g., Shawn E. Fields,
Debunking the Stranger-in-the-Bushes Myth: The Case for Sexual Assault Protection Orders,
2017 Wis. L. Rev. 429, 484 (arguing that sexual assault protection orders—which are different
from DVROs—“should employ the lower preponderance-of-the-evidence standard to ensure
that victims have an effective mechanism to seek prospective relief and governments have an
effective tool in combating the sexual assault epidemic” and stating “[h]owever, procedural
due process may require a more nuanced approach with respect to the types of evidentiary
showings necessary to meet this standard and with the types of prospective relief available to
petitioners”).
8 Timothy Zick, The Constitutional Case for “Red Flag” Laws, Jurist (Dec. 6, 2019, 8:39
PM), https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2019/12/timothy-zick-red-flag-laws/ [https://perm
a.cc/G3TS-L53G]. Other scholars have looked at the due process implications of other types
of similar statutory mechanisms, like DVROs with specific firearm prohibitions, Aaron
Edward Brown, This Time I’ll Be Bulletproof: Using Ex Parte Firearm Prohibitions to Combat
Intimate-Partner Violence, 50 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 159, 196–98 (2019) (arguing that
domestic violence ex parte orders for protection that prohibit firearm possession can survive
due process challenges), or laws designed to disarm those in the throes of severe mental health
crises, Fredrick E. Vars, Symptom-Based Gun Control, 46 Conn. L. Rev. 1633, 1646–47
(2014) (arguing that a law allowing temporary firearm removal from individuals suffering
delusions or hallucinations would not violate due process). None, so far, has assessed the new
spate of extreme risk laws passed predominantly in the last two years.
9 See Red Flag Laws: Examining Guidelines for State Action: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Ronald Honberg, Senior Policy Advisor,
National Alliance on Mental Illness) (describing the risk that “red flag” language can
stigmatize individuals with mental illness).
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enforcement officers or sometimes family members or other professionals
can petition a court for an extreme risk protection order (“ERPO”)10 that
would require a person to surrender his or her firearms and refrain from
acquiring new ones. After receiving the petition, the court can enter a
short-term, ex parte ERPO if the petitioner carries his or her burden of
proof (which can range from showing “good cause” to “clear and
convincing” evidence11). After a full, adversary hearing—at which
petitioner again bears the burden of proof—the court can enter a lengthier,
but still temporary, ERPO.12
Politically and empirically, it is easy to see why such laws are
increasingly popular. They provide tailored, individualized risk
assessments, rather than regulating people’s access to firearms based on
their membership in broad classes like felons or the mentally ill.13And
although scholars are just beginning to evaluate the effectiveness of these
new laws, early studies have shown encouraging results.14 This all points
to ERPOs being an increasingly important part of the debate about gun
rights and regulation going forward.
Of course, there are critics. Some argue that extreme risk laws violate
the right to keep and bear arms.15 These critics challenge the very notion
of a law that allows disarming individuals who have not committed any
crime. District of Columbia v. Heller, after all, said the Second
Amendment “elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding,
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”16

10 In California, the order is known as a “gun violence restraining order” or “GVRO.” Cal.
Penal Code § 18100 (Deering Supp. 2020).
11 See infra notes 302–09 and accompanying text; see also infra Section II.B (discussing
constitutional principles for establishing burden of proof and how they should apply in the
ERPO context).
12 See infra note 309 and accompanying text.
13 See infra Subsection I.B.1.
14 See infra notes 70–82 and accompanying text. That extreme risk laws might be effective
does not make them a panacea, nor should they distract from other forms of effective gun
regulation. See Joseph Pomianowski & Ling Liang Dong, Red Flag Laws Are Red Herrings
of Gun Control, Wired (Sept. 9, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/red-flag-lawsare-red-herrings-of-gun-control/ [https://perma.cc/PSN8-B2UK].
15 Ivan Pereira, Lawmaker Introduces ‘Anti-Red Flag’ Bill in Georgia To Combat Gun
Control Proposals, ABC News (Jan. 15, 2020, 12:52 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/lawmaker-introduces-anti-red-flag-bill-georgia-combat/story?id=68299434 [https://perm
a.cc/7V9S-7CMX] (describing legislation introduced in Georgia to forbid extreme risk laws
that bears the title “Anti-Red Flag—Second Amendment Conservation Act”).
16 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (emphasis added).
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The focus on the right to keep and bear arms is unsurprising, given the
magnetic pull of the Second Amendment in nearly any political or legal
discussion of gun regulation; the tendency is often to evaluate any
proposed rule related to firearms for its conformity with that right in
particular.17 But a myopic focus on the Second Amendment unnecessarily
flattens the gun debate and minimizes different—and often stronger—
constitutional claims.18 More generally, it demonstrates the importance of
firearms law and scholarship which consider how gun rights intersect with
other constitutional rights, including those emanating from the First,19
Fourth,20 and Fourteenth21 Amendments.22
In this increasingly rich and diverse area of constitutional law,
scholarship, and rhetoric, due process has a particularly notable role to
play. Consider the debate over “No Fly No Buy,” which would have
forbidden gun purchases by those on the federal terror watch list. The

17

See generally Joseph Blocher, Gun Rights Talk, 94 B.U. L. Rev. 813 (2014) (arguing that
the invocation of the Second Amendment in debates over proposed gun control laws has
defeated many of these measures).
18 A federal court in California, for example, blocked on First Amendment grounds a Los
Angeles law that would have required city contractors to disclose ties to the NRA. As the NRA
put it, the “First Amendment Defends the Second.” See First Amendment Defends the Second,
NRA-ILA (Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.nraila.org/articles/20191216/first-amendmentdefends-the-second [https://perma.cc/L5TF-6PVS].
19 See, e.g., Timothy Zick, Arming Public Protests, 104 Iowa L. Rev. 223, 236–37 (2018)
(considering, inter alia, the First Amendment rights of speech and assembly and their
interaction with the Second Amendment); Luke Morgan, Note, Leave Your Guns at Home:
The Constitutionality of a Prohibition on Carrying Firearms at Political Demonstrations, 68
Duke L.J. 175, 179, 211–13 (2018) (same).
20 See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin, The Right To Remain Armed, 93 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1, 4–5 (2015)
(considering implications for search and seizure).
21 See, e.g., Pratheepan Gulasekaram, “The People” of the Second Amendment: Citizenship
and the Right to Bear Arms, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1521, 1538 (2010) (illustrating and analyzing
the difficulties of limiting “the people” to non-citizens).
22 Not only do these other rights and interests intersect with the Second Amendment in
important ways, but the courts have also borrowed from many of these frameworks when
fleshing out the contours of the right to keep and bear arms. See Jacob D. Charles,
Constructing a Constitutional Right: Borrowing and Second Amendment Design Choices, 99
N.C. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 1–2) (on file with the Virginia Law Review)
(describing how courts and commentators have borrowed from other constitutional rights
domains in creating a framework for the Second Amendment).
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proposal had broad23 and bipartisan24 political support. Some critics
predictably argued that it violated the Second Amendment,25 but as a
matter of doctrine the more serious objections had to do with due
process.26 Partly as a result, the proposal ultimately died in the Senate.27
A similar dynamic seems to be at work with ERPOs, except that the
consequences are far more important, since such laws have been widely
adopted.28 Although the Second Amendment continues to draw much of
the attention, the more substantive and pressing concern is whether
ERPOs violate gun owners’ due process rights. When the Senate held a
hearing in 2019 about possibly providing federal incentives for state
extreme risk laws, due process concerns were front and center.29 Indeed,
in some areas of the states that have adopted extreme risk laws, local
officials have vowed not to implement them. One Colorado sheriff put the
critique bluntly: “This is the only bill I know of that allows law
enforcement officers to take somebody’s property without due process.”30
But, of course, that assumes the answer to the central question: do
extreme risk laws provide due process? If so, then “due process”
objections should be recognized for what they are: political rhetoric,

23

See, e.g., Press Release, Quinnipiac Univ., Overwhelming Support for No-Fly, NoBuy Gun Law, Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds; Support for Background Checks
Tops 90 Percent Again (June 30, 2016), https://poll.qu.edu/national/releasedetail?ReleaseID=2364 [https://perma.cc/C74J-XGWG].
24 David M. Herszenhorn, Bipartisan Senate Group Proposes ‘No Fly, No Buy’ Gun
Measure, N.Y. Times (June 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/22/us/politics/
senate-gun-control-no-fly-list-terrorism.html [https://perma.cc/4J99-TKVT].
25 See, e.g., Chris W. Cox, Gun Laws Don’t Deter Terrorists: Opposing View, USA Today
(June 14, 2016, 1:01 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/06/13/gun-lawsdeter-terrorists-opposing-view/85844946/ [https://perma.cc/Q6S7-9C52].
26 See Hina Shamsi & Christopher Anders, The Use of Error-Prone and Unfair Watchlists
Is Not the Way To Regulate Guns in America, ACLU (June 20, 2016, 2:45 PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/washington-markup/use-error-prone-and-unfair-watchlists-notway-regulate-guns-america [https://perma.cc/YA9S-NYBS]; see also Joseph Greenlee, No
Fly, No Buy (And No Due Process), Federalist Soc’y (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.fedsoc.org/blog/detail/no-fly-no-buy-and-no-due-process [https://perma.cc/V4U6-7ERV].
27 Lisa Mascaro & Jill Ornitz, Senate Rejects New Gun Sales Restrictions, L.A. Times, June
21, 2016, at A8.
28 See infra Section I.A (describing the spread of extreme risk laws).
29 Marianne Levine, Senate GOP Open to States Allowing Narrow Gun Restriction, Politico
(Mar. 26, 2019, 1:05 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/26/senate-republicansstate-gun-law-reform-1237446 [https://perma.cc/F32F-F6EQ].
30
Governor Polis Signs ERPO Into Law, Delta Cnty. Indep. (Apr. 17, 2019),
https://www.deltacountyindependent.com/governor-polis-signs-erpo-into-law-cms-15033
[https://perma.cc/S2N7-NW6M].

COPYRIGHT © 2020 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

1292

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 106:1285

rather than doctrinal claims.31 If not, then no amount of political or
empirical support will suffice, and this promising new avenue of gun
regulation will be shut down by the courts.
This Article examines that question. Part I explains the spread and
substance of current extreme risk laws. The wave of new extreme risk
laws has encountered opposition from those who claim, often with little
attention to the details of the different statutory regimes and the variety
among them, that they violate due process. Part II lays out the relevant
requirements of due process and applies that framework to the extreme
risk context. Such an analysis can, we hope, be useful to lawmakers,
litigants, judges, and scholars interested in designing or evaluating the
constitutionality of extreme risk laws. Although we do not undertake an
exhaustive or individualized assessment of various state laws, we
conclude that the basic structure of existing extreme risk laws satisfies the
requirements of due process.
The point of the analysis, however, is not to provide a blanket
constitutional defense of extreme risk laws. The goal instead is to identify
and explore an engaging set of constitutional issues raised by a new wave
of firearm regulations. Those issues, in turn, are relevant to our
understanding of how the Constitution intersects with risk regulation, and
what options society has to protect itself from potential harms.
I. EXTREME RISK LAWS: REFRAMING GUN REGULATION
To understand the constitutional stakes of extreme risk laws, it is
important to begin with a basic understanding of why and how they have
been adopted and what design choices legislators face in drafting them.
This Part therefore provides a brief overview of the policy and legal issues
and highlights two features that arguably represent a paradigm shift for
gun regulation: first, the fact that they involve individualized assessments,
and second, the fact that they can apply even to the “law-abiding,
responsible citizens” that District of Columbia v. Heller suggests are the

To be clear, we do not suppose that there is a bright line between “constitutional” and
“political” claims—constitutional law and argument often occur outside the courts, and in fact
the Second Amendment provides an especially robust and interesting example in that regard.
See Jacob D. Charles, The Right To Keep and Bear Arms Outside the Second Amendment 7
(Feb. 23, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Virginia Law Review).
31
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core class of people covered by the Second Amendment.32 These features
have important implications for the due process analysis in Part II.
A. The Spread of Extreme Risk Laws
Debates about gun rights and regulation have commanded an immense
amount of political and legal attention over the past few years, and the
spread of extreme risk laws at the state level has been one of the most
important developments in gun law and policy during that period. Such
laws are designed to fill gaps in the existing regulatory infrastructure, and
to provide targeted, evidence-based interventions before gun risks
translate into gun harms.
Laws have long forbidden particular classes of persons to purchase or
possess guns—those who have committed a serious crime or been
adjudicated mentally ill, for example.33 But such laws, like any
categorical regulation, may be both overbroad and underinclusive with
regard to the concrete risks of gun violence.34 Mental illness, to take one
obvious example, is a poor proxy for future violent behavior, making that
class undeniably overbroad.35 Indeed, despite the intense public focus on
mental illness as a cause of mass shootings, the link is much more
attenuated than is commonly assumed.36 On the other hand, a person with
a newly-manifesting mental health crisis might present a heightened risk

32

See infra Subsection I.B.2 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635
(2008)).
33 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2018) (listing classes of prohibited persons).
34 Some such prohibitions are sometimes justified on grounds other than risk, such as
denying weapons to those deemed “unvirtuous.” See, e.g., Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d
336, 348 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 684–85
(7th Cir. 2010)) (“[M]ost scholars of the Second Amendment agree that the right to bear arms
was tied to the concept of a virtuous citizenry and that, accordingly, the government could
disarm ‘unvirtuous citizens.’”); Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well Regulated Right: The
Early American Origins of Gun Control, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 487, 491–92 (2004).
35 See, e.g., Jeffrey Swanson et al., Violence and Psychiatric Disorder in the Community:
Evidence from the Epidemiologic Catchment Area Surveys, 41 Hosp. & Cmty. Psychiatry: J.
Am. Psychiatric Ass’n 761, 769 (1990); Consortium for Risk-Based Firearms Policy, Guns,
Public Health and Mental Illness: An Evidence-Based Approach for Federal Policy 4–6
(2013), https://www.jhsph.edu/research/centers-and-institutes/johns-hopkins-center-for-gunpolicy-and-research/_archive-2019/_pdfs/GPHMI-Federal.pdf [https://perma.cc/8W4G-XM
KZ].
36 James L. Knoll IV & George D. Annas, Mass Shootings and Mental Illness, in Gun
Violence and Mental Illness 81, 81 (Liza H. Gold & Robert I. Simon eds., 2016).
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of gun violence despite never having been adjudicated mentally ill,
making the class underinclusive as well.37
Extreme risk laws provide a way for guns to be quickly and temporarily
taken away from a person who does not necessarily fit into a prohibited
class, but is at risk of harming himself or others. As the name indicates,
therefore, their focus is on individualized risk itself, not rough status
proxies for risk.38 Although extreme risk laws vary in their particulars
(who can petition, standards of evidence, and length of deprivation), and
the particulars have important constitutional implications—as Part II
addresses in more detail—the basic model is similar to that of domestic
violence restraining orders (“DVROs”), which are available in all fifty
states.39 Although the substance and process varies from state to state,
DVROs allow people victimized by domestic violence to petition a court
for an order that, among other things, can prohibit the respondent from
possessing a firearm.40
Extreme risk laws have spread with striking speed. As of 2017, only
five states had anything on the books that might be described as an
extreme risk law.41 Connecticut adopted the first in 1999, following a

37

See, e.g., Michael A. Norko & Madelon Baranoski, Gun Control Legislation in
Connecticut: Effects on Persons with Mental Illness, 46 Conn. L. Rev. 1609, 1618 (2014)
(reporting that under Connecticut’s extreme risk law, “the majority of gun owners who were
served warrants had no history of psychiatric treatment”); Vars, supra note 8, at 1648–49
(proposing a legal mechanism to disarm those actively experiencing delusions or
hallucinations to stop individuals like Navy Yard shooter Aaron Alexis, who did not have a
prior disqualifying mental health adjudication).
38 See infra Section I.B.
39 See generally A.B.A. Comm’n on Domestic & Sexual Violence, Domestic Violence Civil
Protection Orders (CPOs) (Aug. 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/domestic_violence1/Charts/migrated_charts/2016%20CPO%20Availability%
20Chart.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3ED-VLXQ] (providing a basic overview of domestic
violence civil protection orders in all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the territories).
40 Id. (demonstrating how DVROs vary by state). The point here is only to suggest some
general structural similarities; there are also important distinctions between the two. DVROs
can only be sought by family members or those with similar types of relationships, for
example, while ERPOs can also be sought by law enforcement. DVROs provide a wider range
of protections, including no-contact provisions, while ERPOs respond to a wider range of
risks, including self-harm. Educ. Fund to Stop Gun Violence, Extreme Risk Protection Orders
vs. Domestic Violence Restraining Orders (July 2018), http://efsgv.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/07/ERPO-DVRO-Comparison-July-2018-FINAL-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EA
3-BH8B].
41 Timothy Williams, What Are ‘Red Flag’ Gun Laws, and How Do They Work?, N.Y.
Times (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/06/us/red-flag-laws.html
[https://perma.cc/CH2J-PYSF].
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workplace mass shooting at a state lottery facility.42 The Connecticut law
allows law enforcement officers to temporarily remove firearms from a
person if the police have probable cause to believe “that . . . a person
poses a risk of imminent personal injury to himself or herself or to other
individuals.”43 Indiana adopted a similar law in 2006, allowing police to
temporarily seize guns from a “dangerous individual” pending a judicial
hearing.44 State courts in Connecticut and Indiana have rejected
constitutional challenges thus far.45
The Indiana and Connecticut laws are different from the other extreme
risk laws discussed here—and are often classified as “firearm removal”
laws instead—because they provide only for removal of firearms from
dangerous people who already have them. More recent extreme risk
protection laws apply even to people who have not yet acquired (but
might be seeking) a firearm. Despite that difference, the Connecticut and
Indiana laws are generally regarded as having provided the model for the
second wave of extreme risk laws.
That wave began to swell in 2014, when California adopted an extreme
risk law in the wake of a mass shooting in Santa Barbara.46 California’s
law,47 like many that would follow it, differed from the Connecticut and
Indiana laws in at least two key respects. First, it allows family
members—not just law enforcement officers or state officials—to file
petitions.48 Second, if those petitions are granted by judges, they typically
result in not only the removal of existing firearms but also a prohibition

42

Norko & Baranoski, supra note 37, at 1615.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-38c (2019).
44 Ind. Code Ann. § 35-47-14-1–3, 5 (LexisNexis 2009).
45 See infra notes 87–89 and accompanying text.
46 Like many mass shooters, the perpetrator planned his shooting ahead of time, and those
close to him noted warning signs. Joseph Serna, Elliot Rodger Meticulously Planned Isla Vista
Rampage, Report Says, L.A. Times (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/lame-ln-santa-barbara-isla-vista-rampage-investigation-20150219-story.html [https://perma.cc/
23DQ-ZL6Y].
47 Cal. Penal Code §§ 18100, 18122 (Deering Supp. 2020).
48 See Cal. Penal Code §§ 18150(a)(2), 18170(b) (Deering Supp. 2020). As of September 1,
2020, the category of petitioners under the California law will expand further to include—
with some limitations—employers and teachers. See 2019 Cal. Stat. 6119 (repealing and
replacing Cal. Pen. Code § 18150).
43
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on purchasing them in the future.49 Washington followed suit in 2016,50
as did Oregon in 2017.51
Then came the mass murders at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High
School in Parkland, Florida, on February 14, 2018, and the massive and
ongoing political debate that followed. Increased adoption of extreme risk
laws has been one of the most concrete legislative results of that debate.52
As of August 2020, nineteen states and the District of Columbia had
adopted some version of an extreme risk law.53 Polls suggest that the laws
are quite popular,54 including with gun owners,55 and President Trump
has expressed some support.56 Indeed, some gun rights advocates claim
that “[w]hat makes red flag laws even more dangerous is the bipartisan
support they currently boast.”57 Even the NRA expressed support for

49

Cal. Penal Code § 18120(a) (Deering Supp. 2020). This difference is less significant since,
in 2019, Indiana passed a further law to prohibit purchase of firearms by persons “found to be
dangerous by a circuit or superior court having jurisdiction over the person following a hearing
under” the state’s risk law. See Ind. Code Ann. § 35-47-4-6.5 (LexisNexis Supp. 2019).
50 Wash. Rev. Code § 7.94.010 (2019).
51 Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 166.525, 166.527 (West Supp. 2019).
52 Adhiti Bandlamudi, The Complicated Politics of Passing a Red Flag Law, WUNC (Aug.
9, 2019), https://gunsandamerica.org/story/19/08/09/the-complicated-politics-of-passing-ared-flag-law/ [https://perma.cc/YKK8-9TBV].
53 Giffords L. Ctr. to Prevent Gun Violence, Extreme Risk Protection Orders,
https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/who-can-have-a-gun/extreme-riskprotection-orders/ [https://perma.cc/NG3Z-XNLQ] (last visited March 26, 2020) [hereinafter
Giffords, ERPO].
54
Washington Post-ABC News Poll April 8–11, 2018, Wash. Post,
https://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/politics/washington-post-abc-news-poll-april-8-112018/2301 [https://perma.cc/E8ZJ-TLXA] (last visited Aug. 4, 2020); Emily Guskin & Scott
Clement, Has Parkland Changed Americans’ Views on Guns?, Wash. Post (April 20, 2018,
6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/04/20/has-parklandchanged-americans-views-on-guns/ [https://perma.cc/JZ47-HQZR].
55 Glob. Strategy Grp. & Everytown for Gun Safety, Voters Call for Background Checks,
Strong Red Flag Bill (Sept. 6, 2019), https://everytown.org/documents/2019/09/globalstrategy-group-and-everytown-for-gun-safety.pdf/ [https://perma.cc/UP2D-Q6UM] (poll
conducted on behalf of Everytown for Gun Safety, a gun violence prevention group, reporting
that 85% of respondents favored federal extreme risk legislation, including 78% of gun
owners).
56 President Donald J. Trump Is Committed To Making Our Schools Safer, White House
(Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumpcommitted-making-schools-safer/ [https://perma.cc/F7BY-PB4E].
57
José Niño, Red Flag Laws: The Latest Anti-Gun Scheme, Mises Inst. (July 27, 2018)
https://mises.org/power-market/red-flag-laws-latest-anti-gun-scheme [https://perma.cc/JKD3
-3Z5L].
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extreme risk laws in the immediate aftermath of Parkland,58 though some
argue that the group has actually worked to undermine them, for example
by demanding procedural requirements (like a prohibition on ex parte
removals) that would make the laws either ineffective or impractical.59
Despite this consistently positive trajectory of adoption, the degree to
which extreme risk laws are enforced varies widely, both across states and
across time. In the aggregate, it seems that extreme risk laws are being
used with increasing frequency, albeit more in some states or counties
than others.60 As with any law, differences in enforcement have serious
implications for effectiveness,61 but we largely hold aside those
implementation questions here, except to the degree that they bear on the
constitutional calculus.
At the federal level, extreme risk laws are becoming a major part of the
gun regulation debate, but they have not yet resulted in any legislation.
(This alone should not be surprising, since Congress has not passed
significant gun regulation since the mid-1990s.) As noted above, federal
law already limits the ability of certain classes of people to purchase and
in some case possess firearms, but those limitations do not reach the same
categories as extreme risk laws.62 For example, federal law does limit the

58 Nicole Gaudiano, Under Pressure, NRA Voices Support for Gun Violence Restraining
Orders, USA Today (Mar. 19, 2018, 3:25 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/03/19/under-pressure-nra-voices-support-gun-violence-restraining-orders
/433716002/ [https://perma.cc/2SHE-WKZA]; NRA-ILA’s Chris W. Cox Releases Statement
on School Safety Report, NRA-ILA (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.nraila.org/articles/
20181218/nra-ilas-chris-w-cox-releases-statement-on-school-safety-report [https://perma.cc/
W4PZ-FFMA].
59 Alex Yablon, First, the NRA Watered Down a Red Flag Bill. Then It Mobilized To Kill
It., Trace (July 12, 2018), https://www.thetrace.org/2018/07/red-flag-laws-pennsylvania-nrastephens [https://perma.cc/Z7YC-YA53].
60 Jonathan Levinson, 2 Years In, Oregon’s Red Flag Law Paints A Picture Of Crisis, OPB
(Dec. 17, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.opb.org/news/article/oregon-red-flag-law-two-yearfirearms-protection-order/ [https://perma.cc/PGH8-E4MU] (noting variation within Oregon
about ERPO petitions, with a third of counties seeing no petitions almost two years after
adoption).
61 Aaron J. Kivisto & Peter Lee Phalen, Effects of Risk-Based Firearm Seizure Laws in
Connecticut and Indiana on Suicide Rates, 1981–2015, 69 Psychiatric Servs. 855, 855, 858
(2018), https://ps.psychiatryonline.org/doi/10.1176/appi.ps.201700250 [https://perma.cc/L8Q4-6WFZ] (noting that increased enforcement of Connecticut’s firearms removal law was
associated with a fourteen percent reduction in firearm suicides).
62 Whether the subjects of these laws should be understood as lacking Second Amendment
rights or simply be subject to governmental prohibition—whether their rights are “void” or
“voidable”—is an interesting conceptual question. See Jacob D. Charles, Defeasible Second
Amendment Rights: Conceptualizing Gun Laws that Dispossess Prohibited Persons, 83 Law
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ability of those with mental illness to purchase or possess weapons, but
only if such a person has been committed to a mental institution,
adjudicated mentally ill, or found not guilty by reason of insanity.63
Federal law also criminalizes the possession of guns by certain categories
of people who present a particular risk to others, but again the
classification tends to turn on the result of a category-based adjudication,
like a conviction for a felony or crime of violence.64
Since 2018, a few prominent bills regarding extreme risk laws have
been introduced in Congress. One set of proposals would add people
subject to extreme risk orders to the list of people already prohibited from
possessing guns (felons, “mental defective[s],” and so on).65 Others
would create a federal extreme risk law.66 Another and more prominent
set of proposals would incentivize states to adopt their own extreme risk
laws by providing federal support.67 Such proposals seem to have gained
some traction with Democrats and some Republicans,68 though they vary
greatly in their stringency with regard to which kinds of state laws they
would reward and incentivize. For purposes of this Article, what matters
& Contemp. Probs. 53, 53–54 (2020) (citing Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 451–52 (7th Cir.
2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting)).
63 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) (2012); see also 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2019) (defining
“[a]djudicated as a mental defective” and “[c]ommitted to a mental institution”).
64 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012). To be clear, not all of the federal prohibitions require a
conviction, but the procedural protections are significant. Section 922(g)(8), for example,
applies to restrain a “person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner . . . or
child of such intimate partner or person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an
intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child.” Id. § 922(g)(8)(B).
Such an order can only be entered following a hearing in which the respondent had actual
notice and a chance to participate, and must be predicated on a finding that “[1] represents a
credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or . . . [2] by its terms
explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against” the
protected persons. Id. § 922(g)(8)(C)(i)–(ii).
65 See, e.g., Extreme Risk Protection Order Act of 2019, S. 506, 116th Cong. (2019);
Michael A. Foster, Cong. Rsch. Serv., IF11205, Firearm “Red Flag” Laws in the 116th
Congress (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF11205.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5KW-Y9SA].
66 Federal Extreme Risk Protection Order Act of 2018, S. 2521, 115th Cong. (2018).
67 See, e.g., Victor Garcia, Senator Graham Pushes Back on Critics of ‘Red Flag’
Legislation: ‘The Second Amendment Is Not a Suicide Pact,’ Fox News (Aug. 12, 2019),
https://www.foxnews.com/media/senator-graham-pushes-back-on-critics-of-red-flaglegislation-the-second-amendment-is-not-a-suicide-pact [https://perma.cc/4CNA-KKTM];
Alex Leary, Rubio, Nelson Pitch Idea To Encourage States To Adopt ‘Gun Violence
Restraining Orders,’ Tampa Bay Times (Mar. 7, 2018), http://www.tampabay.com/floridapolitics/buzz/2018/03/07/rubio-nelson-pitch-idea-to-encourage-states-to-adopt-gun-violencerestraining-orders/ [https://perma.cc/A42B-8PG4].
68 Leary, supra note 67.
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most is that the conditions themselves tend to track the due process
concerns discussed in more detail below: standards of proof, time limits,
and the like.69
Because extreme risk laws are a relatively new phenomenon, empirical
research about their effectiveness is not complete. Still, the early returns
are promising. Although it is impossible to identify with certainty a single
reason why shootings (including both suicides and homicides) do not
happen, it is easy to imagine how extreme risk laws could contribute to
safety. For one thing, they are crafted so as to apply only to people who
have exhibited warning signs of harmful behavior. Studies indicate that
those signs are present in many cases of both suicide 70 and homicide,
including mass shootings.71 Perhaps most importantly, the majority of
suicides in the United States are effectuated with firearms.72 Given that
the availability of a gun is a strong predictor of whether suicidal ideation
will result in death by suicide73—roughly ninety percent of suicide
attempts involving firearms result in death,74 whereas most people who
survive their first attempt will not ultimately die by suicide75—it stands
to reason that removing firearms from a person in a suicidal crisis will
lower their risk of death.

69 Foster, supra note 65 (“Though varying in the details, several bills . . . would establish
grant programs to aid in implementation of red flag laws, conditioning the receipt of such
grants . . . on adoption of laws that meet certain requirements (e.g., standards of proof for
extreme risk protection orders and time limits on such orders).”).
70 See, e.g., Matthew K. Nock et al., Suicide and Suicidal Behavior, 30 Epidemiologic Revs.
133, 144–45 (2008).
71 James Silver, Andre Simons & Sarah Craun, U.S. Dep’t of Just., FBI, A Study of the PreAttack Behaviors of Active Shooters in the United States Between 2000 and 2013, at 18 (June
2018),
https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/pre-attack-behaviors-of-active-shooters-in-us2000-2013.pdf/view [https://perma.cc/6BFK-H92Z] (reporting patterns of concerning
behaviors by shooters prior to attacks); U.S. Secret Serv. Nat’l Threat Assessment Ctr., Mass
Attacks in Public Spaces—2018, at 12 (July 2019), http://www.secretservice.gov/data/
press/reports/USSS_FY2019_MAPS.pdf [https://perma.cc/4R4Z-GG7Z].
72 Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Implementation and Effectiveness of Connecticut’s RiskBased Gun Removal Law: Does It Prevent Suicides?, 80 Law & Contemp. Probs. 179, 183
(2017).
73 Andrew Anglemyer, Tara Horvath & George Rutherford, The Accessibility of Firearms
and Risk for Suicide and Homicide Victimization Among Household Members: A Systematic
Review and Meta-Analysis, 160 Annals Internal Med. 101, 105 (2014).
74 Matthew Miller, Deborah Azrael & Catherine Barber, Suicide Mortality in the United
States: The Importance of Attending to Method in Understanding Population-Level
Disparities in the Burden of Suicide, 33 Ann. Rev. Pub. Health 393, 397 (2012).
75 See David Owens, Judith Horrocks & Allan House, Fatal and Non-Fatal Repetition of
Self-Harm: Systematic Review, 181 Brit. J. Psychiatry 193, 193–99 (2002).
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Given the recency of extreme risk laws’ adoption, research and
evidence about their effectiveness remains more limited than, for
example, the robust literature regarding public carrying of arms.76 But
some studies have already reported encouraging results, especially with
regard to the prevention of suicides. In perhaps the most prominent study,
scholars analyzed the effectiveness of Connecticut’s “risk warrant” law
between October 1999 and June 2013. The authors concluded that one
suicide was averted for every ten or eleven guns seized.77
Two years after the Connecticut study, another study analyzed the
Connecticut and Indiana laws (being the oldest extreme risk laws, they
are the most natural candidates for empirical analysis; other laws might
eventually be subject to the same scrutiny), and found that Indiana’s
firearm seizure law “was associated with a 7.5% reduction in firearm
suicides in the ten years following its enactment,” while “[e]nactment of
Connecticut’s law was associated with a 1.6% reduction in firearm
suicides immediately after its passage and a 13.7% reduction in firearm
suicides in the post-Virginia Tech period, when enforcement of the law
substantially increased.”78
A third study focused on the link between extreme risk orders and mass
shootings, detailing twenty-one California cases in which orders were
issued, including some involving threatened workplace shootings.79 In
none of those cases did any shooting occur, suggesting perhaps the ways
in which extreme risk orders can be used to prevent not only suicides but

76 Compare John R. Lott, Jr., More Guns, Less Crime: Understanding Crime and GunControl Laws (1998) (arguing that greater firearm ownership leads to reductions in crime),
with Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the “More Guns, Less Crime”
Hypothesis, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1193, 1201 (2003) (critiquing Lott’s hypothesis directly); see
also Abhay Aneja, John J. Donohue III & Alexandria Zhang, The Impact of Right To Carry
Laws and the NRC Report: The Latest Lessons for the Empirical Evaluation of Law and Policy
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 18294, 2012) (examining the results of right
to carry laws).
77 Swanson et al., supra note 72, at 203.
78 Kivisto & Phalen, supra note 61, at 855.
79 Garen J. Wintemute et al., Extreme Risk Protection Orders Intended to Prevent Mass
Shootings: A Case Series, 171 Annals Internal Med. 655, 655–56 (2019),
https://annals.org/aim/fullarticle/2748711/extreme-risk-protection-orders-intended-preventmass-shootings-case-series [https://perma.cc/AJB4-6PDK].
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also mass homicides.80 Not all commentators are convinced, however,81
and the effectiveness of the laws will surely continue to depend on how
often they are enforced—some face “significant barriers” as a matter of
policing.82 Undoubtedly, as with the empirical debates about publicly
carrying,83 the scholarly conversation is just beginning.
The importance and even relevance of that debate is intertwined with
the constitutional objections to extreme risk laws. While a showing of
effectiveness might help the laws survive constitutional challenge (for
example by demonstrating appropriate “tailoring” for purposes of
heightened scrutiny), their utility as a policy matter is not enough to
resolve constitutional challenges emanating from the Second Amendment
and Due Process Clause.
Unsurprisingly, extreme risk laws are opposed by some gun rights
advocates on the basis that they would violate the Second Amendment.
Indeed, in some places this opposition has helped spark the adoption of
“Second Amendment sanctuary” resolutions by which local governments
pledge opposition to gun regulations like extreme risk laws and
background checks.84 As a matter of doctrine, however, Second
Amendment challenges to extreme risk laws have not fared well. There
have been few such challenges, and they have been unsuccessful.85
Admittedly, however, there is a lack of in-depth case law on the issue.
80 Id. at 656 (“Orders after hearings were issued in 14 of 15 cases in which they were
requested. No mass shootings, other homicides, or suicides by persons subject to GVROs were
identified.”).
81 John R. Lott, Jr., & Carlisle E. Moody, Do Red Flag Laws Save Lives or Reduce Crime?
3–4 (Dec. 28, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=3316573 [https://perma.cc/7M3X-6NLX].
82 Swanson et al., supra note 72, at 196 (noting, in the Connecticut context, that “mismatch
between available police staffing resources in most departments and the statutory requirement
that two officers appear as co-affiants before a judge to obtain the risk warrant” and “the
problem of gun storage”); id. at 189 (noting that “very few gun removals were carried out
during the first eight years after the [Connecticut] law went into effect—about twenty per year,
on average, from 1999 through 2006,” but that the number increased “about fivefold—to about
100 cases per year” after the Virginia Tech mass shooting in 2007).
83 Supra note 76 and sources cited therein.
84 Nick Penzenstadler, NRA Helps Sheriffs Fight Gun Laws in Second Amendment
‘Sanctuaries,’ USA Today (May 20, 2019, 3:14 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/investigations/2019/05/20/new-gun-laws-spark-secret-messaging-recalls/37446
76002/ [https://perma.cc/L6U4-8B54].
85 In general, Second Amendment claims have not fared well. See generally Eric Ruben &
Joseph Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of the Right To Keep and
Bear Arms After Heller, 67 Duke L.J. 1433, 1472 (2018) (noting, based on review of more
than 1,100 Second Amendment challenges, a success rate of roughly 9%).
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In Hope v. State,86 a Connecticut appellate court considered a Second
Amendment challenge to the Connecticut firearm removal law described
above. The court rejected the challenge:
[The law] does not implicate the [S]econd [A]mendment, as it does not
restrict the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in
defense of their homes. It restricts for up to one year the rights of only
those whom a court has adjudged to pose a risk of imminent physical
harm to themselves or others after affording due process protection to
challenge the seizure of the firearms. The statute is an example of the
longstanding “presumptively lawful regulatory measures” articulated in
District of Columbia v. Heller.87

Similarly, in Redington v. State, the Indiana Court of Appeals held that
Indiana’s firearms removal law did not violate the state constitutional
right to keep and bear arms, because it applied only to those shown, by
clear and convincing evidence, to “present a risk of personal injury to
either themselves or other individuals.”88 As a result, it did not “place a
material burden” on the “core” right of law-abiding citizens to bear arms
in self-defense.89
Although this Article is not focused on Second Amendment challenges,
it is worth noting that regulating the risk of firearm misuse at the
individual level is not a wholly new phenomenon. The practice of
imposing peace bonds on those who threatened harm was wellestablished at common law, including in England centuries before the
American Revolution.90 Indeed, although such laws have largely fallen

86

133 A.3d 519 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016).
Id. at 524–25.
88 992 N.E.2d 823, 834–35 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
89 Id. at 835.
90 See 5 William Blackstone, Commentaries *251 (“[P]reventive justice consists in obliging
those persons, whom there is a probable ground to suspect of future misbehaviour, to stipulate
with and to give full assurance to the public, that such offence as is apprehended shall not
happen; by finding pledges and securities for keeping the peace, or for their good behaviour.”);
Joel B. Samaha, The Recognizance in Elizabethan Law Enforcement, 25 Am. J. Legal Hist.
189, 195 (1981) (describing the peace bond process and explaining that, to initiate the process,
“[t]he person in fear of harm appeared before a Justice of the Peace and swore under oath that
he was in danger of life or limb and therefore, that he ought to have surety of the peace by the
person who created the danger”); see also Sidney Childress, Peace Bonds—Ancient
Anachronisms or Viable Crime Prevention Devices?, 21 Am. J. Crim. L. 407, 416–21 (1994)
(describing the origin and history of peace bonds).
87
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into desuetude, versions of them still exist in many states today.91 These
types of laws could be used against those who pose a particular threat with
firearms.92
Extreme risk laws also potentially raise Fourth Amendment concerns.93
For example, a warrant to search for or seize firearms issued with an
ERPO implicates the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that such
warrants issue only upon probable cause.94 New Jersey’s extreme risk law
is currently being challenged on Fourth Amendment grounds because it

91 12 Am. Jur. 2d Breach of Peace & Disorderly Conduct § 38 (2019) (footnotes omitted)
(“Statutory enactments in most jurisdictions reflect the common-law principle that as a matter
of preventive justice a person may under certain circumstances be ordered by a court to give
security against future breach of the peace by him or her, and that he or she may be imprisoned
for not complying with such an order. Peace bond statutes serve a salutary purpose and are an
effective and proper deterrent to violence, either actually perpetrated or immediately
threatened.”); see also Commonwealth v. Miller, 305 A.2d 346, 348 (Pa. 1973) (stating that
Pennsylvania’s Surety of the Peace Act “provides preventive justice and requires persons of
whom there is probable cause to suspect future violent behavior to give full assurance to the
public against the anticipated offenses”); id. at 350 (Nix, J., concurring) (describing the Act
as fulfilling “the need in our law of a provision that will enable a court to take prompt and
effective action to deter a threatened or imminent wrong”). Pennsylvania repealed the law at
issue in Miller in 1978. Act of Apr. 28, 1978, Pub. L. No. 1978-53, 1978 Pa. Laws 202, 232.
92 Saul Cornell, The Right To Keep and Carry Arms in Anglo-American Law: Preserving
Liberty and Keeping the Peace, 80 Law & Contemp. Probs. 11, 24 (2017) (“Rather than
encourage individuals to arm themselves in response to such threats [of armed violence],
English law required individuals to seek out a magistrate, justice of the peace, or constable
and have the aggressor disarmed and placed under a peace bond.”); C. Kevin Marshall, Why
Can’t Martha Stewart Have A Gun?, 32 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 695, 717 (2009) (noting, in
the context of historical firearm prohibitions, that “[o]ne means of conserving the peace, apart
from prosecuting those who breached it, was to order persons who posed particular risks to
provide sureties of the peace”).
93 Michael Hammond, Kafkaesque ‘Red Flag Laws’ Strip Gun Owners of Their
Constitutional Rights, USA Today (Apr. 19, 2018, 2:30 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/04/19/red-flag-laws-strip-gun-rights-violate-constitution-column/526221002/ [https://perma.cc/ZR4E-LRGZ] (“At their core, [extreme risk laws] allow the police to
convene a Kafkaesque secret proceeding, in which an American can be stripped of his or her
gun rights and Fourth Amendment rights, even though gun owners are barred from
participating in the hearings or arguing their side of the dispute.”).
94 State v. Hemenway, 216 A.3d 118, 121, 128, 134 (N.J. 2019) (holding that New Jersey’s
domestic violence restraining order law, which permitted issuance of a warrant to search for
firearms upon a showing only of “good cause,” violated the Fourth Amendment). In response
to this ruling, New Jersey’s Attorney General issued a directive to law enforcement and
prosecutors tasked with enforcing the state’s extreme risk law—which uses the same standard
as in the domestic violence law—to “establish and request that the search warrant associated
with an ERPO application be issued by the court under the standard of probable cause.” See
Gurbir S. Grewal, Att’y Gen., Att’y Gen. Law Enf’t Directive No. 2019-2, at 5 (Aug. 15,
2019).
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authorizes issuance of a search warrant upon a showing of “good cause.”95
And beyond the specific ERPO challenges, the presence of firearms raises
a host of Fourth Amendment issues that are beyond the scope of this
Article.96
These constitutional issues are important and consequential, but in our
view, the more serious challenges to extreme risk laws are those involving
due process.97 Answering those challenges requires a more detailed
understanding of how the laws work and what the Constitution requires.
This Part explores the former; Part II will address the latter.
B. A New Paradigm for Gun Regulation?
Extreme risk laws are novel not only in terms of the recency of their
adoption but also in the way that they frame the issue of gun regulation.
Person-based firearm restrictions have traditionally been conceptualized
and justified as a means of denying guns to classes of persons thought to
pose a particular risk to themselves or to others. Extreme risk laws,
because they are triggered by individualized determinations about risk,
represent an effort to regulate at the retail, rather than wholesale, level—
focusing on particularized situations rather than broad groups. Moreover,
extreme risk laws bring to the foreground an implicit but foundational
division between thinking about gun regulation as punishment—a frame
captured by the emphasis on “law-abiding citizens”98—and thinking
about gun regulation as risk management.

Michael Hill, New Jersey’s Red Flag Law Gets Challenged in Federal Court, NJ Spotlight
(Nov. 21, 2019), https://www.njspotlight.com/2019/11/new-jerseys-red-flag-law-getschallenged-in-federal-court/ [https://perma.cc/7K35-4DKV] (describing the Fourth
Amendment challenge).
96 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hicks, 208 A.3d 916, 947 (Pa. 2019), cert. denied sub nom.
Pennsylvania v. Hicks, 140 S. Ct. 645 (2019) (holding that mere possession of a concealed
firearm in public does not suffice to justify a Terry stop); Bellin, supra note 20, at 5 (“As gun
carrying becomes both lawful and common, even in major cities, police lose the ability to
invoke public gun possession as a Fourth-Amendment-satisfying basis for investigation.”).
97 Even advocacy organizations have emphasized the importance of incorporating due
process protections. See, e.g., Educ. Fund to Stop Gun Violence et al., Extreme Risk Laws: A
Toolkit for Developing Life-Saving Policy in Your State 14 (n.d.), https://live-giffordsorg.pantheonsite.io/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Extreme-Risk-Laws-Toolkit.pdf
[https://perma.cc/57T3-292F] (arguing that laws should be “reflective of a state’s existing
processes for protective orders with due process protections” and should include an
“[o]pportunity for respondent[s] to petition for early termination”).
98 See infra Subsection I.B.2.
95
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Both of these characteristics have important implications for the due
process analysis below, but they are also important to consider on their
own terms. To the degree that extreme risk laws present a new paradigm
of gun regulation—one focused on individualized determinations rather
than proxies, and risk rather than punishment—they may offer a new way
forward in an often-stalled gun debate.
1. Retail Gun Regulation
State and federal laws prohibit certain classes of persons from buying
or possessing arms. Federal law covers felons, those adjudicated mentally
ill, fugitives from justice, habitual users of illegal drugs, and others.99
Such laws have been overwhelmingly upheld against constitutional
challenges.100 The felon prohibitor, in particular, has been the subject of
hundreds of post-Heller Second Amendment challenges (nearly a quarter
of all such challenges), roughly ninety-nine percent of which have
failed.101 Although this is not the place to interrogate the constitutionality
of any particular class-based prohibition in detail, the legal battles over
those prohibitions can help shed light on what is so novel and interesting
about extreme risk laws.
Class-based prohibitions have been evaluated and justified through a
variety of different lenses. Some believe that such prohibitions are
constitutional based on their historical lineage,102 or the notion that the
prohibited persons (felons, at least) are “unvirtuous.”103 But perhaps the
most straightforward and intuitive way to understand them is as
representing a determination about risk of harm—the categories of
persons prohibited by law from owning arms are those who likely pose a
heightened danger to themselves or others. On this view, the
classifications are proxies for what really matters: risk.
But, of course, proxies are only that. Many people with felony
convictions—and certainly most people with mental illness—will
probably never harm another person, and might not even present much of
99

See generally 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012) (making it unlawful for felons, fugitives, drug
addicts, and the mentally ill to possess a firearm).
100 See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 85, at 1481 (noting a four percent success rate of
Second Amendment challenges to laws prohibiting arms possession by particular classes of
people).
101 Id.
102
See, e.g., United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 600 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[T]he longstanding
limitations mentioned by the Court in Heller are exceptions to the right to bear arms.”).
103 See supra note 34 and sources cited therein.
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a heightened risk of doing so. As the title of an oft-cited law review article
puts it: “Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?”104 Of course, the fact
that a proxy is imperfect does not mean it is impermissible—it is the very
nature of a rule to be overbroad and underinclusive, after all,105 and nearly
every legal prohibition reaches conduct that might not be directly harmful
in any particular instance. Most speeding drivers don’t hurt anyone, but
that doesn’t make speed limits irrational.
When such overbreadth impinges on constitutional interests, including
the right to keep and bear arms, law has ways to relieve the pressure. One
is through specified mechanisms for restoration of gun rights. 106 As a
matter of constitutional law, however, the push for tailoring manifests in
as-applied challenges—those seeking to carve out a particular individual
from a class-based prohibition. A felon with a distant, non-violent
conviction, for example,107 or a person with a single mental health episode
long ago,108 might argue that a class-based prohibition is unconstitutional
as applied in his or her particular case.
The connection to extreme risk laws is clear; the notion is that legal
burdens should be properly tailored to the individual. ERPOs, too, rely on
individualized determinations, albeit in the opposite direction. While asapplied challenges carve people out of legal prohibitions, extreme risk
laws temporarily impose them, but for the same reason—a mismatch
between the reasons for existing legal prohibitions (lessening risk) and
their application in a particular case. When a class-based proxy is
particularly inappropriate (like for the dangerousness of a non-violent
felon with an old conviction), perhaps it should be disregarded.
Conversely, when class-based proxies fail to reach those that they
should—a dangerous person without a disqualifying felony, for

104

Marshall, supra note 92.
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev.
1685, 1695 (1976) (“The use of rules, as opposed to standards, to deter immoral or antisocial
conduct means that sometimes perfectly innocent behavior will be punished, and that
sometimes plainly guilty behavior will escape sanction.”).
106 See David T. Hardy, Losing and Regaining Firearm Rights: A Guide for the Legal
Practitioner, 16 T.M. Cooley J. Prac. & Clinical L. 133 (2014); Michael Luo, Felons
Finding It Easy To Regain Gun Rights, N.Y. Times (Nov. 13, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/14/us/felons-finding-it-easy-to-regain-gun-rights.html
[https://perma.cc/RMD2-YMX6].
107 Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 343, 356 (3d Cir. 2016).
108 Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 681 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
105
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example—extreme risk laws provide a solution.109 The two phenomena
are therefore interlocking and interrelated ways of policing and managing
the line between prohibited and non-prohibited persons.
Since this policing machinery is put into motion by an extreme risk
petition, one important design choice is who gets to file such petitions in
the first place. As a matter of legal design, the considerations at this stage
are in some sense straightforward. Granting a petition (i.e., issuing an
extreme risk order) depends on obtaining accurate and timely information
about truly risky behaviors. That might push in favor of a large class of
potential petitioners, so as to maximize information. But because the
consequences of an order are serious (deprivation of a firearm, even for a
temporary period), there are countervailing reasons to limit the class of
petitioners, so as to lower the risk of false positives and harassment. In
order for an extreme risk law to be effective, then, the category of
available petitioners should include people with the best information
about risks and incentives to accurately report it.
Perhaps the most obvious category of potential petitioners are law
enforcement officers, whose very job involves identifying and responding
to risks. It is far beyond the scope of this Article to fully account for the
ways in which law enforcement can or should respond to firearm threats,
but it is worth noting that the mere presence of a gun—even in places that
statutorily guarantee the right to carry one publicly without a license—
can generally support a stop-and-frisk.110 Extreme risk laws extend that
power one step further (by forbidding the person from having a gun in the
first place), but they also involve a further procedural step: a judge must
approve the order, which of course is not required for a frisk. The
consequences and process are both elevated.
In practice, there does not seem to be much disagreement about
whether extreme risk laws should permit petitions from law enforcement
109 The individualized nature of ERPO proceedings makes it hard to credit the critique that
they are based on “groupings.” See, e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz, A Yellow Light for Red-Flag
Laws, Wall St. J. (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-yellow-light-for-red-flaglaws-11565132144?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=5
[https://perma.cc/CV9S-VJWA]
(“Research shows that any group of people identified as future violent criminals will contain
many more who won’t be violent (false positives) than who will (true positives). More true
positives mean more false ones. Such groupings also fail to identify many future violent
criminals (false negatives).”). That is an argument against the usual class-based prohibitors,
not against ERPOs—if anything, it is a strong argument for them.
110
See United States v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694, 711–12 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Harris,
J., dissenting). But the Supreme Court has nonetheless declined to make a blanket “firearm
exception” to the requirements for a stop and frisk. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000).
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officers—every existing law does so.111 In a handful of states with
particularly strict laws, only law enforcement officers can file petitions.112
It is worth noting that special procedural concerns can potentially arise in
these proceedings. The subjects of petitions might well be unrepresented
(since the proceedings are civil, the State need not, as a constitutional
matter, provide counsel), and could potentially misunderstand the
procedures and consequences of an ERPO (including potential criminal
sanctions for non-compliance). Where such problems are present—and
we are unaware of any studies on point—due process rights might very
well be implicated.
A second category of possible petitioners—permitted in fourteen states
and the District of Columbia—is immediate family members and others
sharing a household with the subject of the order.113 As compared to law
enforcement officers, family or household members generally have
informational advantages, since they are presumably well-positioned to
observe warning signs such as suicidal ideation, threats to others, and the
like—behaviors that might not yet have resulted in any kind of formal
legal intervention or determination, but could be predictive of future
harm. As a matter of incentives, it also seems reasonable to begin with an
assumption—though of course it will not always be the case—that family
members genuinely care for the health and well-being of other family
members and will only report seriously risky behaviors. Indeed, the law
in various ways does tend to presume a relationship of trust and mutual
obligation within a family.114 And an ERPO is a much less intrusive
option than other possibilities like civil commitment or arrest.
At the same time, those same family members might have strong
incentives to underreport risk, for fear of the consequences to the gun
111

Giffords, ERPO, supra note 53.
See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 790.401 (2019); 8 R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 8-8.3-1, 8-8.3-3 (Supp. 2019);
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 4053 (2018); see also Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-38c (2019) (providing that
a complaint may be filed by two law enforcement officers or one state’s attorney or assistant
state’s attorney).
113 Shannon Frattaroli et al., Assessment of Physician Self-Reported Knowledge and Use of
Maryland’s Extreme Risk Protection Order Law, JAMA Network Open, Dec. 20, 2019, at 1,
1 (“Such laws allow specified groups (law enforcement in all states, and family in 14 states
and the District of Columbia) to petition a court when an individual is behaving
dangerously . . . .”).
114 Cf. Jacqueline J. Glover, Should Families Make Health Care Decisions?, 53 Md. L. Rev.
1158, 1162 (1994) (noting, in the course of arguing in favor of “family decision” laws in the
health care context, that “[t]here is a rich tradition that is supported in current law and policy
that families are primary care providers and have widereaching obligations to do so”).
112
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owner115 or to themselves. This can lead to serious complications for
enforcement. In Coral Gables Police Department v. Tamayo, for
example, a woman reported to the police that her husband was a serious
threat.116 The police petitioned for an ERPO, but on the witness stand she
denied that she had claimed him to be a threat. After the hearing, she said
she recanted because she was afraid of the consequences, according to the
law enforcement officers present, but the court nonetheless denied the
order.117 The police department filed an appeal challenging the denial, but
the court of appeals affirmed.118
In certain toxic family environments—those involving serious distrust
or abuse, for example—it is possible that false claims might be filed in an
effort to harass or even disarm those who do not present any legitimate
threat. Opponents of gun laws frequently raise this concern,119 though it
is hard to say empirically whether and how it has played out in practice.
Some extreme risk laws attempt to address it by specifically including
civil or criminal penalties for those who knowingly file petitions based on
false information.120 And, as noted below,121 the risk of false positives
seems far outweighed by the risk of false negatives.
The expansion of petitioner categories beyond immediate family and
household members is controversial. Some states permit mental health
providers,122 school administrators,123 medical professionals, co-workers,
and educators124 to petition for an extreme risk order. As with law
115

See, e.g., Nicole Darrah, Florida Mom Insists Her Son Who Allegedly Threatened
Mass Shooting Is ‘Just a Little Kid’ Making Jokes, Fox News (Aug. 21, 2019),
https://www.foxnews.com/us/florida-mom-son-mass-shooting-just-a-little-kid
[https://perma.cc/E9TL-7WJJ].
116 Initial Brief of Coral Gables Police Department at 5–9, Coral Gables Police Dep’t v.
Tamayo, 283 So. 3d 404 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019) (per curiam) (No. 18-2275) (describing
claims made to police).
117 Id. at 12–17 (describing hearing testimony and post-hearing statements).
118 Tamayo, 283 So. 3d 404.
119 See, e.g., Allison Graves, Did Florida Police Seize a Man’s Gun Without Due Process?
No, PolitiFact (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.politifact.com/florida/statements/2018/apr/04/freethought-project/did-florida-police-seize-mans-gun-out-due-process-/ [https://perma.cc/6QX6
-UEC3]; Hammond, supra note 93; Niño, supra note 57.
120 See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 18200 (Deering Supp. 2020); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140,
§ 131V (2018); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 166.543(3) (West 2019); Wash. Rev. Code § 7.94.120(1)
(2019).
121 See infra text accompanying note 137.
122 See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 5-601(E)(2) (LexisNexis 2019).
123
See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 6340 (Consol. Supp. 2020). New York seems to be unique in this
regard.
124 See, e.g., Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 134-61 (LexisNexis 2019).
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enforcement and family members, these are categories of people who
might be in a position to observe and respond to risks, including those that
might presage a mass shooting in a school or workplace. But the broader
the category of petitioners, the stronger the concerns about
misidentification and abuse. When the California legislature attempted to
amend its law to allow high school and college employees and co-workers
to file petitions, then-Governor Jerry Brown vetoed the measure,125
though Governor Gavin Newsom later signed the expansion into law.126
Who actually petitions is an important but separate question from who
has a right to do so. In California, at least as of 2017, petitions seem to
come mostly from law enforcement officers. Of the nearly two hundred
gun violence restraining orders issued, only a dozen were initiated by
petitions from family members.127 In Maryland, by contrast, more than
half of the more than three hundred gun removal petitions filed in the first
three months of the law’s passage were filed by family members.128 It
seems plausible that, as the general public becomes more aware of
extreme risk laws—which, again, are a very new development—their use
by family members (where permitted) will increase.
The question of who can petition for an extreme risk order also
intersects in interesting ways with broader currents of theory, politics, and
doctrine surrounding the right to keep and bear arms. Some accounts of
the right are heavily suffused with what might be called—to borrow from
First Amendment theory129—a pathological perspective, in the sense that
many gun owners feel that the right should be calibrated to protect against

125 Melody Gutierrez, Jerry Brown Vetoes California Bill To Expand Gun Restraining
Orders, S.F. Chron. (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/JerryBrown-vetoes-California-bill-to-expand-gun-13261282.php [https://perma.cc/7PTK-74BZ].
126 Don Thompson, California Adopts Broadest US Rules for Seizing Guns,
Associated Press (Oct. 11, 2019), https://apnews.com/3ca4e1f867f2490c98b042358f8bf3b3
[https://perma.cc/L2PZ-TRJA].
127 Melody Gutierrez, California Starts Slowly on Seizing Unstable People’s Guns, but That
Could Change, S.F. Chron. (May 11, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/ar
ticle/California-starts-slow-on-seizing-unstable-12906043.php [https://perma.cc/6Y3K-MN
NX].
128 Ovetta Wiggins, Red-Flag Law in Maryland Led to Gun Seizures from 148 People in
First Three Months, Wash. Post (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/mdpolitics/red-flag-law-in-maryland-led-to-148-gun-seizures-in-first-three-months/2019/01/1
5/cfb3676c-1904-11e9-9ebf-c5fed1b7a081_story.html [https://perma.cc/XU8L-LS6Z].
129 See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 Colum.
L. Rev. 449, 449–50 (1985).
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the worst possible eventuality: tyranny and oppression.130 From this
perspective, the right to keep and bear arms is truly, as the title of the
NRA’s official journal claims, “the ‘1st Freedom,’”131 and the one “the
others lean on the most,” as NRA Vice President Wayne LaPierre has put
it.132 For those holding such a view, any governmental efforts to regulate
guns are likely to trigger a sense of persecution and fear, feeding the kind
of apocalyptic rhetoric that is all too familiar in the gun debate.133
Standard efforts to regulate guns through legislation tend to raise the
specter of disarming law-abiding citizens, rather than focusing on those
who present a risk to others. Extreme risk laws seem responsive to that
concern, since they apply only to particular individuals and depend on a
specific petition reviewed by a judge.
And yet extreme risk laws also add a new wrinkle, at least for some,
because the object of fear is not necessarily the government, but “[a]ntigun family members, friends, or acquaintances [who] can levy dubious
accusations to justify the confiscation of law-abiding gun owners’
guns,”134 notwithstanding the aforementioned penalties for misuse. A
leader of one gun rights organization has claimed that “the target is
frequently an abused victim who is most in need of the wherewithal to
protect against an abuser.”135 The tyrannical figure here is no longer a
faceless bureaucrat, member of the beltway elite, or anti-gun judge, but
one’s own friends and family.136 Of course, those people are also among
the ones most at risk.
130

See Darrell A.H. Miller, Retail Rebellion and the Second Amendment, 86 Ind. L.J. 939
(2011) (providing examples and analyzing whether and how such a view could be manifested
in doctrinal rules).
131 America’s 1st Freedom, https://www.americas1stfreedom.org/ [https://perma.cc/2EG8G3DW] (last visited July 11, 2020).
132 Wayne LaPierre, Guns, Freedom, and Terrorism 29 (2003).
133 See, e.g., Blocher, supra note 17, at 826–27 (providing examples of this rhetoric).
134 Niño, supra note 57.
135 Hammond, supra note 93. We are not aware of any evidence to support this claim. There
is, however, evidence to suggest that victims of abuse are at even higher risk when firearms
are accessible. Aaron J. Kivisto, et al., Firearm Ownership and Domestic Versus Nondomestic
Homicide in the U.S., 57 Am. J. Preventative Med. 311, 312 (2019) (concluding that the
presence of a gun makes it five times more likely that a woman will be killed by an abusive
partner).
136 Some accounts of the anti-tyranny theory of the Second Amendment describe private
violence and oppression as a form of tyranny. See, e.g., Nicholas J. Johnson et al., Firearms
Law and the Second Amendment: Regulation, Rights, and Policy 1256–57 (2d ed. 2018)
(arguing that “[a]lthough ‘tyranny’ is typically thought of as being perpetrated by governments
against their people, this is, arguably, not the only context in which the unrestrained abuse of
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Although some critics allege that such orders are frequently abused, it
is difficult to find concrete evidence supporting this claim, and the legal
processes and personal incentives already provide substantial protection
against false reporting. Given the incentives, it seems likely that there will
be far more false negatives (guns not removed from a situation of extreme
risk) than false positives (guns wrongly removed thanks to false or
misleading testimony). Even people with valid claims may be
substantially deterred by the prospect of going to court to convince a
judge that a family member is engaged in risky behavior. If the situation
in a gun-owning household has deteriorated to the point that one family
member is prepared to falsely accuse another of having engaged in risky
behaviors (rather than, for example, simply throwing the guns away or
hiding them), then it seems all the more likely that the risk of gun violence
is especially heightened. And even then, many ERPO laws already
provide for legal sanction in cases of false reporting,137 to say nothing of
other potential tort liability. In short, if the question is which risk—false
accusations or gun violence—presents the greater prospect of harm, the
answer seems clear.
In any event, these are largely questions of policy and politics, and our
focus here is on constitutionality. On that front, the tradeoff between
preventing harms of firearm misuse and protecting the rights of gun
owners is relevant only inasmuch as it factors into constitutional
analysis—for example in resolving a Second Amendment or Due Process
Clause challenge.
One final implication of the proxy-based approach to class restrictions
is worth noting. Under federal law, the classes of persons prohibited from
owning arms are basically adjudicated statuses—one cannot become a
felon, or fugitive, or even mentally ill within the meaning of the statute
without a court procedure to which basic due process protection applies.
The tradeoff, then, is a thorough process the result of which is a poor
proxy. As recent debates about “No Fly No Buy” and the rights of college
students accused of sexual assault show, these due process concerns

power is properly considered tyranny” and including “individual-on-individual tyranny” as
one of the “categories of oppression with which the framers of the Second and Fourteenth
Amendments were especially concerned”).
137 See supra statutes cited in note 120.
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continue to animate scholarship and case law about how to balance
important competing interests.138
2. Beyond “Law-Abiding, Responsible Citizens”: Risk-Based Gun
Regulation
In the closing paragraphs of his majority opinion in Heller, Justice
Scalia rejected Justice Breyer’s argument that the constitutionality of gun
regulations should be evaluated with attention to contemporary costs and
benefits:
Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood
to have when the people adopted them, whether or not future
legislatures or (yes) even future judges think that scope too
broad. . . . The Second Amendment is no different. Like the First, it is
the very product of an interest balancing by the people—which Justice
Breyer would now conduct for them anew. And whatever else it leaves
to future evaluation, it surely elevates above all other interests the right
of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth
and home.139

This short passage invokes two interrelated themes: the reliance on
history to determine the “scope” of the Second Amendment (including
“the People” who can claim its protections), and the suggestion that the
right is limited to “law-abiding, responsible citizens.”140 Extreme risk
laws represent a challenge to this general paradigm.
Second Amendment law and scholarship is, in many ways, backwardlooking. This is in part a natural implication of Heller, which blessed as
constitutional a number of “longstanding prohibitions,” including
restrictions on possession of firearms by felons and those adjudicated as
mentally ill.141 The apparent suggestion that those prohibitions are
138

See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text (describing the debate over No Fly No
Buy); H. Hunter Bruton, Cross-Examination, College Sexual-Assault Adjudications, and the
Opportunity for Tuning Up the “Greatest Legal Engine Ever Invented,” 27 Cornell J.L. & Pub.
Pol’y 145, 147 (2017) (exploring “tradeoffs involved in requiring or rejecting crossexamination” in sexual assault hearings).
139 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634–35 (2008) (second emphasis added).
140 Id. at 644 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (“[W]hen it finally drills down on
the substantive meaning of the Second Amendment, the [majority] limits the protected class
to ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens.’”).
141 Id. at 626 (majority opinion) (“[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill . . . .”).
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constitutional because of their lineage has inspired efforts to excavate
their history—to understand how and why, for example, certain
categories of criminals were prohibited from having firearms.142 The
historical approach faces serious complications, which we cannot fully
examine here. Federal law denies firearms to those convicted of domestic
violence, for example, and that law has been—to our knowledge—
universally upheld.143 But a narrow search for specifically analogous
historical predicates might call that law into question,144 especially
considering that the law was egregiously slow to criminalize intimatepartner violence against women.145 Courts and commentators often
sidestep those challenges by deriving broad principles from specific
historical examples—a tradition of denying firearms to the unvirtuous or
the dangerous, for example.146
Perhaps the central animating theme is the focus on “law-abiding
citizens” who want to use their arms for traditionally lawful purposes.
This is evident in doctrine. As noted above, the Heller majority
announced that the Second Amendment “surely elevates above all other
interests the right of law-abiding responsible citizens to use arms in
defense of hearth and home.”147 And even the category of “dangerous and
unusual” weapons that are subject to legal prohibition is defined in
contradistinction to those weapons “typically possessed by law-abiding
citizens for lawful purposes.”148
But the “law-abiding” frame is even more prominent in political
rhetoric about guns. Gun rights advocates regularly voice concern that
142

See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 92, at 717.
See, e.g., Stimmel v. Sessions, 879 F.3d 198, 201 (6th Cir. 2018); United States v. White,
593 F.3d 1199, 1205–06 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 645 (7th Cir.
2010) (en banc); United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1139–41 (9th Cir. 2013).
144 Carolyn B. Ramsey, Firearms in the Family, 78 Ohio State L.J. 1257, 1301 (2017)
(“Historical support for the exclusion of domestic violence offenders from Second
Amendment protection appears rather thin.”).
145 See Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105
Yale L.J. 2117, 2121–42 (1996).
146 See, e.g., United States v. Bena, 664 F.3d 1180, 1184 (8th Cir. 2011) (“Although persons
restricted by § 922(g)(8) need not have been convicted of an offense involving domestic
violence, this statute—like prohibitions on the possession of firearms by violent felons and
the mentally ill—is focused on a threat presented by a specific category of presumptively
dangerous individuals.”).
147 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008); see also id. at 644 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“[W]hen it finally drills down on the substantive meaning of the Second
Amendment, the [majority] limits the protected class to ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens.’”).
148 Id. at 625 (majority opinion).
143
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gun regulations will disarm or otherwise burden law-abiding citizens
rather than the criminals who will never comply with gun regulations
anyway.149 The “law-abiding citizens” frame carries within it a lot of
freighted meanings, of course, which helps account for its political power
and value.150
ERPOs provide a useful means to unpack the assumptions and
complications of this framing, because a person subject to an ERPO might
be both law-abiding and “responsible.” On the one hand, that might be
thought to raise constitutional concerns. But on closer examination, it
shows why the “law-abiding, responsible” frame is simply inapt for
answering hard questions about the constitutionality of gun laws.
It is clear that the “law-abiding” line is not sufficient to account for the
range of existing class-based prohibitions. Age-based restrictions, for
example, are of course not predicated on violations of the law, nor are
those that apply to people who have been civilly committed due to mental
illness. The most intuitive underlying concern for those prohibitions is a
risk of danger,151 and courts have overwhelmingly upheld them.152
Extreme risk laws fit naturally into the same kind of category. The frame
is safety rather than punishment; ex ante rather than ex post.
One possible response is that this is what Justice Scalia meant by
emphasizing the word “responsible”—even if law-abiding, minors as a
class are too irresponsible to be trusted with firearms in the same way as
adults.153 That principle could help explain the constitutional treatment of
minors and perhaps other persons who are “law-abiding” and yet can be

149

See, e.g., Cox, supra note 25.
See Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller,
122 Harv. L. Rev. 191, 239 (2008).
151 See, e.g., United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that the federal
ban on juvenile handgun possession is “part of a longstanding practice of prohibiting certain
classes of individuals from possessing firearms—those whose possession poses a particular
danger to the public”).
152 See also Horsley v. Trame, 808 F.3d 1126, 1133–34 (7th Cir. 2015) (upholding Illinois
statute requiring written consent of parent or guardian for persons under age twenty-one to
own a firearm); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, &
Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 208–09 (5th Cir. 2012) (upholding law restricting ability of persons
under age twenty-one to purchase firearms from certain sources).
153 See Amit Vora, Defending an Under-21 Firearm Ban Under the Second Amendment
Two Step, 71 Stan. L. Rev. Online 1, 2 (2018) (arguing that the above-cited decisions present
“historical evidence that, according to the Framers, only those with adequate ‘civic virtue’ are
worthy of wielding lethal weapons, and one’s capacity for virtue grows with age”).
150
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denied firearms: Heller’s specific carve-out for the “mentally ill” is a
prime example.154
The difficult question is what it means to be “responsible” in a legally
relevant sense. This question has not yet received sustained attention in
the context of gun rights and regulation, but of course it has long been
fundamental to other areas of law. In torts, to take perhaps the most
obvious example, judges and scholars have long connected
responsibility—in the sense of legal duty or liability—and risk.155 Might
ERPOs be understood, at least in part, through a similar lens?
In some sense, the answer is obvious: The basis of an extreme risk order
is, of course, a showing of risk. This basic feature has important
consequences for both how such laws are received politically and how
they are treated constitutionally. As noted above, standard gun
regulations—including those that are both popular and constitutional—
deny guns to people who have, for example, committed a felony or been
adjudicated mentally ill. Even those skeptical of gun regulation tend not
to object to these laws (except perhaps as applied in particular cases156).
The acts and adjudication accompanying such designations are generally
considered sufficient proof that the person is either too dangerous or too
unvirtuous to possess a firearm.157
Some, however, believe that extreme risk laws present a different
problem, since they are based solely on predictions about future
violence.158 Critics often invoke the movie Minority Report, in which a
“PreCrime” department arrests people based on psychic predictions about

154

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
See, e.g., Jules Coleman, Risks and Wrongs (1992); Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts
on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale L.J. 499, 499 (1961); Stephen G. Gilles,
Causation and Responsibility After Coase, Calabresi and Coleman, 16 Q.L.R. 255, 255 (1996)
(arguing for “a conception of causation as risk-creation and a conception of responsibility as
risk-avoidability”).
156 See, e.g., Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 348 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) (permitting
as-applied challenges to felon prohibitor in limited circumstances); Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty.
Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 686, 690 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (permitting as-applied
challenges to mental illness prohibitor in limited circumstances).
157 Charles, supra note 62, at 17.
158 See, e.g., Dershowitz, supra note 109. But see David French, Red-Flag Laws—Yes, We
Limit Liberty When There’s Evidence of a Threat, Nat’l Rev. (Aug. 7, 2019),
https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/red-flag-laws-yes-we-limit-liberty-when-theresevidence-of-a-threat/ [https://perma.cc/YT2R-VLJB] (noting and critiquing this point).
155
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their likelihood of committing crimes.159 The suggestion is that gun
owners should not be “punished” for things they have not yet done.
But both of those premises are flawed: the analogy to crime is
inapposite, and the suggestion that extreme risk laws are based on
mindreading is misleading. Although the consequence (denial of access
to a firearm) might be significant, extreme risk laws are a civil proceeding
designed to protect both the gun owner and those close to him or her. So
long as it is complied with, the order carries no criminal sanctions, and
there is no situation in which “gun owners are presumed to be guilty and
must then prove their innocence.”160 Of course, constitutional protections
apply in the civil context as well as the criminal context, but the relevant
protections have to do with due process rather than constitutional criminal
procedure rights.161 The rhetoric of criminal law is unhelpful in
understanding or resolving those civil due process issues.
So, too, is it unhelpful to compare extreme risk procedures to a kind of
mindreading. Extreme risk laws focus on risky behaviors, not imputed
mental states.162 And there is nothing unique or unconstitutional about
that. The law regularly imposes restrictions on people who have not
committed crimes, based in part on the risk that they might do so in the
future. Domestic violence restraining orders, for example, are granted
based on a showing of risk—one need not wait until a crime has been
committed (or, for that matter, adjudicated).163 A person who does

159 Minority Report (DreamWorks 2002). The movie is based on a short story by Philip K.
Dick. See Philip K. Dick, The Minority Report, in The Philip K. Dick Reader 323, 324 (1997).
160 Niño, supra note 57. Some critics of extreme risk laws have wrongly suggested that the
burden is on the gun owner. See, e.g., Mica Soellner, Wisconsin Assembly Speaker’s New
Take on Red-Flag Gun Laws Still Misses Target, PolitiFact (Dec. 6, 2019),
https://www.politifact.com/wisconsin/statements/2019/dec/06/robin-vos/wisconsin-assemb
ly-speakers-new-take-red-flag-gun-/ [https://perma.cc/M4VR-FH6E]. For a discussion of the
burden of proof, which always rests with the petitioner, see infra Subsection II.B.2.
161 See, e.g., Tony Lovasco, ‘Red Flag Laws’ Violate More Than Just Gun Rights, Hill (Aug.
12, 2019), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/457058-red-flag-laws-violatemore-than-just-gun-rights [https://perma.cc/XG9X-9G7U] (listing, inter alia, the Confrontation Clause and the protection against unreasonable search and seizures as among the
rights that are “explicitly violated under red flag laws”).
162 Florida’s law, to take one example, points to a list of fifteen factors like acts or threats of
violence, violation of prior orders, domestic violence convictions, abuse of controlled
substances, and the like. See Fla. Stat. § 790.401(3)(c) (2019).
163 For example, in Wisconsin, a temporary restraining order or injunction may be issued
where the petition alleges facts sufficient to show “[t]hat the respondent engaged in, or based
on prior conduct of the petitioner and the respondent may engage in, domestic abuse of the
petitioner.” Wis. Stat. § 813.12(5)(a) (2017–18).
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commit a crime can be subject to post-sentencing confinement based on
“clear and convincing evidence” (not evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt) that he or she is mentally ill and dangerous.164 The fact that these
kinds of orders are constitutional shows that constitutional interests can
be restricted even without a criminal proceeding.
To return to the question, then: ERPOs fit uncomfortably with the
frame that “law-abiding” persons are immune to gun regulation, but that
shows the weakness of the frame, which cannot account even for basic
(and constitutional) limitations on minors and the mentally ill. The
addition of the “responsible” frame helps—not because of a normative
judgment about moral desert, but by connecting responsibility and risk.
That is something that the law does in many different contexts, but
foregrounding it in the context of gun regulation (as separated from lawabidingness) may represent something of a paradigm shift for the gun
debate.
It also presents a new set of constitutional concerns and questions
rooted not in historical analogy—the typical focus of the gun debate—but
in due process. If risk is to be the basis for disarmament, what does the
Constitution require in terms of how that risk is shown? It is to that
question we now turn.
II. DUE PROCESS AND EXTREME RISK LAWS
Part I canvassed the framework for extreme risk laws. Such laws vary
from state to state, and each state provides different methods and
mechanisms for seeking, sustaining, and enforcing such laws. The laws
aim to balance the need to keep dangerous persons away from firearms
with the recognition that firearm ownership and possession are
fundamental property and liberty interests. This Part focuses on the
constitutional questions that extreme risk procedures raise, and in
particular on whether those laws comply with the requirements of the Due
Process Clause.
It is important to be clear at the outset about the scope of inquiry. The
question is not whether the government can ever take firearms away, but
what the government needs to do and show before it can.165 As the
164

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d) (2018) (permitting civil commitment based on diagnosis
of mental condition).
165
To be sure, there are some gun rights advocates who simply believe guns are an
untouchable constitutional entitlement not subject to divestment at all. See, e.g., Rachel
Malone, There Isn’t Enough Due Process To Make Red Flag Laws Tolerable, Gun Owners of
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Supreme Court has said, “[p]rocedural due process rules are meant to
protect persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or
unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property.”166 The rules that
courts impose on government actors seek to balance the individual and
governmental interests in light of the risks of an erroneous deprivation.
Those rules have to be flexible: there is no formulaic answer to what due
process demands before the government may seize property or infringe a
liberty interest.167 At its core, due process requires notice and a hearing,
and it requires the government to provide certain protections during the
hearing to guard against wrongful deprivations. This Part examines the
two issues most salient to extreme risk laws: (1) the rules governing
deprivation prior to a full hearing, and (2) the burden of proof the State
imposes on the petitioner before granting an ERPO. We conclude that
extreme risk laws can meet both of these demands.
A. Constitutional Requirements for Pre-Hearing Deprivations
The fundamental requirements of due process are notice and an
opportunity to be heard.168 In normal cases, these must occur before the
government deprives an individual of constitutionally protected liberty or
Am. (Aug. 16, 2019), https://gunowners.org/there-isnt-enough-due-process-to-make-red-flaglaws-tolerable/ [https://perma.cc/YY9W-UHX2] (“No matter how much procedural due
process you add in (i.e., give notice, let the accused have an attorney, hear charges against
him, and defend himself in court), red flag laws still lacks [sic] substantial due process (i.e.
it’s wrong to have guns taken away based on a future prediction).”). But, as the Supreme Court
has held, “substantive due process” concerns with regulatory and not punitive government
action can yield to important and compelling interests. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739, 748 (1987) (upholding pretrial detention of those charged with certain crimes and
noting that the Court has “repeatedly held that the Government’s regulatory interest in
community safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual’s liberty
interest”). This Article does not address any potential substantive due process arguments about
extreme risk laws; those are likely coterminous with the merits of any Second Amendment
challenge.
166 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978).
167 Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894–95 (1961) (“The very
nature of due process negates any concept of inﬂexible procedures universally applicable to
every imaginable situation.”); John V. Orth, Due Process of Law: A Brief History 5 (2003)
(“One of the most frequently asked questions in American constitutional history has been,
what is required by the constitutional guarantee of ‘due process of law’?”).
168 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“The fundamental requirement of due
process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”
(citations omitted)); see also Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 Yale
L. & Pol’y Rev. 1, 12 (2006) (“The default rule is that notice and a hearing must be provided
before the government takes adverse action, except in exigent circumstances.”).
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property.169 “Due process, however, does not always require prior
process.”170 The Supreme Court has long recognized “extraordinary
situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies
postponing the hearing until after the event.”171 The Court has described
these “extraordinary situations” in various ways,172 but it has grouped
them into two categories: (1) occasions “where a State must act quickly”
and (2) those “where it would be impractical to provide predeprivation
process.”173 The first category is exemplified in laws motivated by urgent
concerns over public health and safety;174 the second by situations in
which a government official negligently or carelessly deprives a person
of his or her property, precluding any practical way to have provided a
prior hearing.175 Extreme risk laws implicate the first category, on which
the rest of this Section focuses.

169

Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and
Constitutional Remedies, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 309, 329 (1993) (remarking that “[f]air predeprivation procedures, which reduce the likelihood of erroneous deprivations of liberty and
property, constitute one form of protection” of the Due Process Clause).
170 Jordan ex rel. Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 343 (4th Cir. 1994) (upholding Virginia
law permitting removal of a child from the parents’ custody before a hearing when necessary
to prevent imminent harm).
171 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971); see also Bd. of Regents of State Colls.
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569–70 (1972) (“When protected interests are implicated, the right to
some kind of prior hearing is paramount.”).
172 See, e.g., Roth, 408 U.S. at 570 n.7 (“rare and extraordinary situations”); Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 (1972) (“truly unusual” situations); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542
(1971) (“emergency situations”); cf. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 240
(1988) (“An important government interest, accompanied by a substantial assurance that the
deprivation is not baseless or unwarranted, may in limited cases demanding prompt action
justify postponing the opportunity to be heard until after the initial deprivation.”).
173 Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997); see also Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527,
539 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (stating
that “either the necessity of quick action by the State or the impracticality of providing any
meaningful predeprivation process, when coupled with the availability of some meaningful
means by which to assess the propriety of the State’s action at some time after the initial
taking, can satisfy the requirements of procedural due process”).
174 See, e.g., Rhonda Wasserman, Procedural Due Process: A Reference Guide to the United
States Constitution 70 (2004) (“[T]he Court has permitted a deprivation of property without a
prior opportunity to be heard when necessary to protect public health or safety.”).
175 In this second situation, the government can still comply with due process even though
no pre-deprivation hearing was held so long as it provides adequate post-deprivation remedies.
See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 539 (describing this alternative); see also Susan Bandes, Monell,
Parratt, Daniels, and Davidson: Distinguishing a Custom or Policy from a Random,
Unauthorized Act, 72 Iowa L. Rev. 101, 108 (1986) (“[T]he random and unauthorized act by
a state employee is the gravamen of the Parratt doctrine.”).
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1. Supreme Court Guidelines for Seizures Prior to a Full Hearing
In Fuentes v. Shevin,176 the Court identified three factors necessary to
justify a deprivation before a full hearing takes place.177 First, in each case
the seizure must be “directly necessary to secure an important
governmental or general public interest.”178 Next, there must be “a special
need for very prompt action.”179 And finally, in prior cases approving
such seizures, “the State ha[d] kept strict control over its monopoly of
legitimate force; the person initiating the seizure ha[d] been a government
official responsible for determining, under the standards of a narrowly
drawn statute, that it was necessary and justified in the particular
instance.”180 As commentators have noted, the cases Fuentes cited that
justified seizures prior to a hearing “involved immediate, irreparable,
grave and widespread harm.”181
Applying these factors, the Fuentes Court struck down state laws that
permitted a creditor to institute an ex parte replevin action and gain
possession of a debtor’s property prior to notice and a hearing.182 In the
Court’s view, the interests in play were mostly private, there was no
special need for quick action, and, perhaps most importantly, no
government official made even “a summary determination of the relative
rights of the disputing parties before stepping into the dispute and taking
goods from one of them.”183 In other words, the challenged laws allowed
a private party’s mere filing to trigger state-enforced deprivation of a
property right. That mechanism did not comply with due process.
Four years after Fuentes, the Supreme Court systematized its
procedural due process jurisprudence, after commentators bemoaned the
confusion generated by the due process boom of the early 1970s.184 In
Mathews v. Eldridge,185 the Court held that a pre-deprivation hearing was
not required before the government terminated a recipient’s disability
176

407 U.S. 67 (1972).
Id. at 90–92.
178 Id. at 91.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Note, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and Due Process Requirements, 82 Yale L.J. 1023, 1028
(1973).
182 Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 96.
183 Id. at 80.
184
See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1276–
77 (1975).
185 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
177
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benefits. It announced three factors courts must consider to determine
what process is due and when:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.186

Like the Fuentes factors, the Eldridge balancing test derived principles
from the Court’s prior case law upholding seizures with no predeprivation hearing and justifying future deprivations under certain
conditions. That case law is more extensive than one might suppose. In
fact, the Court has permitted the government to deprive an individual of
a constitutionally protected interest without a pre-deprivation hearing in
all of the following situations187:
• seizing and destroying rotten food;188
• issuing rent orders in defense area housing;189

186

Id. at 335.
Scholars have observed how courts have limited these exceptional situations to those
involving a need for quick government intervention. See, e.g., Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional
Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and
Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 Hastings L.J. 1325, 1399 (1991)
(describing the general due process rule and stating that “[s]ometimes, however, notice and
opportunity to be heard can be postponed until after the seizure is effected,” but noting that
“such a relaxation of the ordinary rule requires an ‘extraordinary situation’ and a ‘special need
for very prompt action’” (quoting Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 90–91)); Terrance G. Reed & Joseph
P. Gill, RICO Forfeitures, Forfeitable “Interests,” and Procedural Due Process, 62 N.C. L.
Rev. 57, 77 (1983) (describing the requirement for quick action before such pre-hearing
deprivations can occur); Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and Due Process Requirements, supra note
181, at 1026 (“The Court has carefully limited the scope of the ‘extraordinary situations’
exception under which the notice and hearing required by due process may be postponed until
after seizure of property.”).
Some have even criticized items on the canonical list because they do not seem sufficiently
like emergency situations. E.g., Leslie Book, The Collection Due Process Rights: A Misstep
or a Step in the Right Direction?, 41 Hous. L. Rev. 1145, 1181 (2004) (“The lumping of
taxation together with other extraordinary situations, however, is not persuasive: although
collecting taxes is crucial to the nation’s well-being, the need for speed that might justify the
absence of a predeprivation hearing seems much more pronounced when considering
government actions to destroy contaminated food or mislabeled drugs.”).
188 N. Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 319–20 (1908).
189 Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 505 (1944).
187
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placing a savings and loan association into conservatorship;190
confiscating mislabeled drugs;191
ordering the sequestration of a debtor’s personal property;192
seizing movable property prior to a forfeiture action;193
terminating disability benefits;194
suspending a driver’s license upon multiple infractions prior to a
full hearing;195
imposing corporal punishment on junior high students;196
suspending a driver’s license for refusal to take a breathalyzer;197
suspending a horse trainer’s license;198
ordering an immediate halt to mining operations;199
suspending an indicted official of a federally insured bank before
any hearing;200 and
suspending a tenured public employee without pay.201

Consistent with the Eldridge factors, “[u]nderlying these decisions
upholding deprivation of property prior to a hearing was a determination
that the need for speedy government action to protect the public interest
outweighed any private interest in obtaining the [full] trappings of due
process prior to the property infringement.”202 Thus, in each of these
cases, the Court has considered the government’s interest important
enough to justify even “substantial” burdens on affected persons.203

190

Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 247 (1947).
Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 600 (1950).
192 Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 619–620 (1974).
193 Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 664 (1974).
194 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 349 (1976).
195 Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 110, 113 (1977).
196 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 682 (1977).
197 Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 19 (1979).
198 Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64 (1979).
199 Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 304–05 (1981).
200 Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 232 (1988).
201 Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 931, 933–34 (1997).
202 Reed & Gill, supra note 187, at 77; see also Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and Due Process
Requirements, supra note 181, at 1028 (“The explicit situations actually sanctioned by the
Supreme Court for postponing notice and hearing have all exhibited threats to important
government or public interests.”).
203
Barry, 443 U.S. at 64 (“Unquestionably, the magnitude of a trainer's interest in avoiding
suspension is substantial; but the State also has an important interest in assuring the integrity
of the racing carried on under its auspices.”).
191
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Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n is
exemplary.204 There, the Court entertained a pre-enforcement challenge
to the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (“the Act”)
on a variety of constitutional grounds. The plaintiffs challenged on due
process grounds the provisions of the Act that required the Interior
Secretary to order the immediate cessation of mining operations if the
Secretary concluded that an operation “creates an [imminent] danger to
the health or safety of the public, or is causing, or can reasonably be
expected to cause significant, imminent environmental harm to land, air,
or water resources.”205 If an aggrieved mine operator complained about
this interference with its property, the Secretary had to respond within
five days, and the Act provided for administrative review of the
Secretary’s decision.206 In addition, a cessation order expired thirty days
after issuance unless the Secretary held a public hearing.207
In reviewing this scheme, the Supreme Court first noted the general
rule about pre-deprivation hearings, but emphasized that it “has often
acknowledged . . . that summary administrative action may be justified in
emergency situations,” such as for the protection of public health and
safety.208 And those exact concerns motivated the Act’s immediatecessation provisions, which the Court observed were passed in the wake
of a tragic mining disaster in West Virginia that caused 124 deaths and
left 4,000 people homeless.209 In other words, the Act’s provisions
allowing for immediate cessation were “precisely the type of emergency
situation in which this Court has found summary administrative action
justified.”210
Notwithstanding this recognition, the plaintiffs had argued that the Act
failed to set forth a clear set of “objective criteria” by which the Secretary
could issue a cessation order. The Court rejected that argument, finding
that the statutory definitions of “imminent danger to the health and safety
of the public” were sufficient.211 And the fact that some of the Secretary’s
orders were overturned on review showed not that the Act’s criteria were

204

452 U.S. 264.
Id. at 298 (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a)(2) (1976)).
206 Id.
207 Id. at 299 n.42.
208 Id. at 299–300.
209
Id. at 300 n.44.
210 Id. at 301.
211 Id. (citation omitted).
205
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flawed, but that its review procedure worked.212 “The possibility of
administrative error inheres in any regulatory program; statutory
programs authorizing emergency administrative action prior to a hearing
are no exception.”213
Applying this framework, lower courts have routinely upheld seizures
prior to a hearing, even in cases involving extremely weighty—indeed
fundamental—private interests, when the government’s interests in
protecting public health and safety are at their zenith. Three examples are
particularly illuminating because of the nature of the fundamental private
interests at stake: (1) removing a child from a parent’s care and custody,
(2) confining a person in psychiatric care against their will, and (3)
imposing restraints on a person’s right to contact or be around another
person or live in one’s own home, most often in the domestic violence
context.
First, courts have upheld statutes that permit ex parte orders authorizing
government officials to remove minors from a parent’s custody and
control when “immediate removal is necessary to avoid imminent danger
to the child’s life or health.”214 Although custody and control of one’s
children is “an interest far more precious than any property right,”215 the
“ex parte order authorizing temporary custody with [the State] is
permitted because of its short duration and the requirement of further
action by the State before custody can be continued.”216 As one court put
it, this situation justifies immediate action under the Fuentes factors
because the State’s interest is so compelling and the children’s needs
212

Id. at 302.
Id.
214 F.K. v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Polk Cnty., 630 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Iowa 2001).
215 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59 (1982); see also Jordan ex rel. Jordan v.
Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 342 (4th Cir. 1994) (“There are few rights more fundamental in and to
our society than those of parents to retain custody over and care for their children, and to rear
their children as they deem appropriate.”); F.K., 630 N.W.2d at 808 (acknowledging, in the
course of upholding a statute permitting ex parte pre-deprivation removal, that “[t]he United
States Supreme Court has consistently recognized that a parent’s ‘care, custody, and control’
of a child is a fundamental liberty interest given the greatest possible protection” (citation
omitted)); In re Carmelo G., 896 N.W.2d 902, 907–08 (Neb. 2017) (“The interest of parents
in the care, custody, and control of their children is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental
liberty interests recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court.”).
216 In re Carmelo G., 896 N.W.2d at 908; see also Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 954 F.
Supp. 1056, 1061 (E.D. Pa. 1997), aff’d, 174 F.3d 368 (3d Cir. 1999) (“In most child custody
cases, ex parte judicial proceedings satisfy due process because the government has a strong
interest in protecting children from immediate abuse, and pre-deprivation process would
insufficiently protect that interest.”).
213
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require quick intervention.217 Still, “only an imminent danger to a child’s
life or health can justify removal of the child without notice and a hearing
first.”218
Similarly, courts have upheld statutes allowing civil commitment
orders after ex parte judicial determinations.219 These statutes temporarily
take away a person’s liberty, forcibly confining a person against their will.
They often permit this detainer “when any person appears to be mentally
ill and an imminent danger to others or to himself or gravely disabled.”220
Because of the exceedingly important liberty interests at stake, courts
have carefully delimited the timeframe and reasons for which the
temporary, emergency commitments can last before a hearing is
Newton v. Burgin, 363 F. Supp. 782, 787 (W.D.N.C. 1973), aff’d, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974).
The Newton court acknowledged that the third Fuentes factor was not met because individuals,
and not government officials, could institute petitions, but it held that the due process approach
must be flexible to meet the needs in the present situation.
218 Paul Chill, Burden of Proof Begone: The Pernicious Effect of Emergency Removal in
Child Protective Proceedings, 41 Fam. Ct. Rev. 457, 458 (2003); see also Doe v. Kearney, 329
F.3d 1286, 1293 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Consequently, courts have recognized that a state may
constitutionally remove children threatened with imminent harm when it is justified by
emergency circumstances.”). Indeed, in this context, courts have allowed state officials to
remove children faced with imminent harm without even securing judicial authorization
through anything akin to an ex parte proceeding. See Alyson Oswald, They Took My Child!
An Examination of the Circuit Split Over Emergency Removal of Children from Parental
Custody, 53 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1161, 1193 (2004) (describing cases and concluding that
“[r]emoving a child from parental custody without judicial authorization, under emergency
circumstances, does not violate parents’ procedural due process rights”); see also generally
Mark R. Brown, Rescuing Children from Abusive Parents: The Constitutional Value of PreDeprivation Process, 65 Ohio State L.J. 913 (2004) (tracing the history of emergency removal
of children and arguing for its constitutionality).
219 See, e.g., In re Daniel G., 320 P.3d 262, 273 (Alaska 2014); see also State ex rel. Doe v.
Madonna, 295 N.W.2d 356, 365 (Minn. 1980) (“Although the state may have a compelling
interest in temporary ex parte detention of persons dangerous to themselves or others, such
detention is justified only for the amount of time necessary to prepare for a probable cause
hearing before a neutral judge.”); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 388 (M.D. Ala. 1974)
(“[W]here a person said to be mentally ill and dangerous is involuntarily detained, he must be
given a hearing within a reasonable time to test whether the detention is based upon probable
cause to believe that confinement is necessary under constitutionally proper standards for
commitment.”). Some states even allow for temporary holds for forty-eight or seventy-two
hours without a court order. Leslie C. Hedman et al., State Laws on Emergency Holds for
Mental Health Stabilization, 67 Psychiatric Servs. 529, 530 (2016) (identifying eight states
that allow for emergency holds with no court order).
220 Curnow v. Yarbrough, 676 P.2d 1177, 1181 (Colo. 1984); see also Civil Commitment of
the Mentally Ill, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1190, 1205 (1974) (“Recent statutory enactments appear to
indicate a trend toward restricting involuntary civil commitment to the dangerous mentally ill
and toward limiting the type and increasing the severity of harm necessary to support a finding
of dangerousness.”).
217
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required.221 But they have recognized that quick ex parte procedures
withstand due process concerns.222
Courts have even considered how such emergency civil commitment
orders can affect firearm rights under federal law. In United States v.
Rehlander,223 for example, the defendants challenged their convictions
under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), which forbids anyone who has been
“committed to a mental institution” from possessing firearms.224 The
defendants had previously been involuntarily committed under Maine’s
emergency commitment procedures after ex parte proceedings. They did
not contest the constitutional sufficiency of that process, but argued that
it would violate their due process rights to permanently deprive them of
their Second Amendment right based on such a finding.225 The First
Circuit agreed, and thus read the federal law to exclude such ex parte
commitments.226 It noted, however, that “[t]his would be a different case
if [S]ection 922 addressed ex parte hospitalizations and provided for a
temporary suspension of the right to bear arms pending further
proceedings.”227 In other words, the court recognized that suspension of
firearm rights after an ex parte hearing would not violate due process so
long as the suspension was temporary.
Lastly, courts have upheld ex parte restraining orders that can
considerably curtail a restrained person’s movement, behavior, and
authority—including parental custody or visitation or even firearm

221 See, e.g., Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, supra note 220, at 1265 (“In emergency
detention, the short range goals are either to protect the individual from serious harm or to
prevent him from inflicting immediate injury on others, and to confine him until a more
permanent disposition of his case can be made.” (footnotes omitted)).
222 See Richard C. Boldt, Emergency Detention and Involuntary Hospitalization: Assessing
the Front End of the Civil Commitment Process, 10 Drexel L. Rev. 1, 13 (2017) (describing
cases permitting postponement of a hearing when “immediate action may be necessary to
prevent imminent harm to the restrained individual”). Here, as in the child removal context,
courts have allowed such emergency detentions without even requiring any judicial
authorization. Id. at 17 (recounting how courts have recognized that in this context “the state’s
interest in protecting the safety of severely mentally ill individuals and the general public is
sufficiently weighty to displace any entitlement to a preliminary judicial review of the grounds
for an emergency psychiatric admission”).
223 666 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2012).
224 Id. at 46 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(4) (2006)).
225
Id. at 47.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 49.
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possession.228 These orders provide a useful comparison because many
states have partially modeled their extreme risk laws on domestic violence
restraining orders.229 Most states permit temporary domestic violence
restraining orders to be issued ex parte upon sufficient proof that the
person poses a serious risk of harm.230 And courts have recognized the
unique factors that justify short-term ex parte deprivations prior to a
hearing:
The existence of exigent circumstances justifies dispensing with the
requirement of holding a hearing before the ex parte TRO is granted.
The availability of a prompt post-deprivation hearing (by way of a show
cause hearing), combined with the fact that the petitioner retains the
burden of proof during the hearing, ensures that the respondent’s
interests are adequately protected.231

In Kampf v. Kampf, for example, the Michigan Court of Appeals
considered a husband’s due process challenge to his wife’s procurement
of an ex parte order restraining him from contacting her, entering the
property where she lived or worked, threatening to injure her, or
possessing firearms.232 The court rejected his challenge. So long as the
228

See, e.g., Kampf v. Kampf, 603 N.W.2d 295, 296 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (restrained
husband argued the statute permitting an ex parte procedure was “unconstitutional because it
deprives him of his property rights and limits his right to liberty by subjecting him to the
possibility of arrest and prosecution without notice or procedural safeguards”); Blazel v.
Bradley, 698 F. Supp. 756, 768 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (upholding Wisconsin statute allowing for
ex parte petitions only when it “is construed to require a showing of imminent harm”). To be
clear, ERPOs are not a substitute for DVROs, which—as noted in the text—cover not only
firearm possession but also other matters like no contact provisions, counseling provisions,
and other protections. Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for
Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 Hofstra L. Rev. 801, 810
(1993) (“Currently, all fifty states plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico make civil
protection orders available to victims of domestic violence.”).
229 See, e.g., Giffords, ERPO, supra note 53 (noting that the ERPO process in most states
“typically mirror[s] the domestic violence restraining order processes in their respective
states”).
230 David H. Taylor et al., Ex Parte Domestic Violence Orders of Protection: How Easing
Access to Judicial Process Has Eased the Possibility for Abuse of the Process, 18 Kan. J.L. &
Pub. Pol’y 83, 84 (2008) (recognizing that under almost all state domestic violence statutes “a
victim of domestic violence may obtain an emergency ex parte order of limited duration” that
“grant[s] various forms of relief, such as a prohibition of contact with the victim, exclusion
from a shared residence, a prohibition of removing possessions from the residence, and
physical care and custody of the parties’ children”).
231
Hamilton ex rel. Lethem v. Lethem, 270 P.3d 1024, 1033 (Haw. 2012) (citations
omitted).
232 Kampf, 603 N.W.2d at 297.
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statute requires prompt post-order notice and an opportunity to be heard,
“[t]here is no procedural due process defect in obtaining an emergency
order of protection without notice to a respondent when the petition for
the emergency protection order is supported by affidavits that
demonstrate exigent circumstances justifying entry of an emergency order
without prior notice.”233
And just like in the civil commitment context, courts have also
analyzed how these domestic violence orders can affect firearms rights.
In State v. Poole, the defendant challenged his indictment for violating an
ex parte restraining order that required him to surrender his firearms.234
The court noted that the right to keep and bear arms is fundamental but
held that the risk of erroneous deprivation was mitigated by the short
deprivation period (six days between the order and the hearing) as well as
the requirement that the trial court find that a danger of domestic violence
“clearly appear[ed]” from specific facts.235 Moreover, the State’s interest
in protecting domestic violence victims was “clear,”236 and could not be
effectively vindicated without ex parte hearings.237
In short, the Due Process Clause protects against erroneous or wrongful
deprivations of constitutionally protected liberty or property interests. But
it does not erect insurmountable barriers. Though the situations justifying
seizures prior to a full hearing are indeed “extraordinary,” those situations
occur when the government needs to act swiftly to ensure public safety.
To be sure, in those extraordinary situations justifying seizure before a
hearing, courts are quick to emphasize that due process requires a “prompt
post-deprivation hearing.”238 Yet “there is no obvious bright line dictating
when a postseizure hearing must occur,”239 and the flexibility demanded

233

Id. at 299; see also Brown, supra note 8, at 192 (arguing that a firearm prohibition
attached to an ex parte order for protection does not violate procedural due process so long as
the deprivation is temporary).
234 State v. Poole, 745 S.E.2d 26, 28 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013).
235 Id. at 36.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 37 (“Additional procedural safeguards, such as requiring a fully contested hearing
before forbidding someone subject to an ex parte order from possessing firearms, would
prevent the State from protecting victims of domestic violence at a time that those protections
are most required. There is no way to protect victims of domestic violence that would provide
a predeprivation hearing during the crucial period between service of the ex parte order and
the ten-day hearing.”).
238
See, e.g., Hamilton ex rel. Lethem v. Lethem, 270 P.3d 1024, 1033 (Haw. 2012).
239 United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S.
Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 562 (1983).
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by the due process inquiry requires a fact-bound determination of the
interests and values at stake in a particular situation.240 Sometimes even
lengthy delays satisfy due process if the government’s interest is strong
enough.241 As one commentator has noted, “when the government
deprives a person of a protected interest under exigent circumstances, that
preliminary decision is made hastily. Afterwards, the government may
need some time to gather facts to determine whether it should even seek
to make the deprivation permanent.”242 In precisely these situations,
“[t]he magnitude of the public interest in a correct decision counsels
strongly against any constitutional imperative that might require overly
hasty decisionmaking.”243
Finally, it is important to underscore that the cases upholding child
custody, civil commitment, and restraining orders do not concern criminal
proceedings, although criminal proceedings might proceed alongside
them. In other words, the government can, in many situations and for
numerous reasons, deprive fundamental property and liberty interests
without adjudicating a person guilty of violating the criminal law.244 The
Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 924 (1997) (“Due process is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”). The Supreme Court has
instructed courts to look at several different factors in assessing the delay: (1) “the importance
of the private interest and the harm to this interest occasioned by delay;” (2) “the justification
offered by the Government for delay and its relation to the underlying governmental interest;”
and (3) “the likelihood that the interim decision may have been mistaken.” Fed. Deposit Ins.
Corp. v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 242 (1988).
241 Mallen, 486 U.S. at 242–43 (upholding a ninety-day delay).
242 Wasserman, supra note 174, at 76–77.
243 Mallen, 486 U.S. at 244.
244 There are a variety of reasons why officials may seek to use a civil process instead of a
criminal one. Mary Cheh describes some of those reasons in the context of civil protection
orders, which carry over fairly well to the extreme risk context:
First, the very process of getting a civil protection order serves notice on the offender
that her conduct is in question, that the courts are involved, and that serious
consequences may ensue if she keeps up her present behavior. This by itself may deter
future abuse [or threatening behavior]. A CPO also can be an alternative to prosecution
where, although criminal conduct plainly may be involved, the matter presents difficult
proof problems, the victim is tentative about prosecution, or other facts—such as higher
prosecution priorities—render prosecution impracticable or unlikely.
Second, a civil protection order can be sought, indeed may have to be sought, by the
victim. In jurisdictions where the prosecutor is unwilling to proceed against a batterer
and where private citizens are prevented from initiating criminal actions, this option
offers a self-help alternative. Third, once a civil protection order is entered, violation
thereof triggers arrest. Fourth, the use of a civil protection order permits the court, in
fashioning the precise terms of the order, to proscribe conduct—under pain of criminal
punishment—that in itself is not a crime. For example, some civil protection orders
240
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common objection that extreme risk laws are improper attempts at
“[s]topping ‘future crimes’” is thus fundamentally misplaced.245 The
government has the power to act swiftly to protect public safety without
invoking the machinery of its criminal justice system, so long as it
comports with the Due Process Clause in doing so.
2. Extreme Risk Laws’ Ex Parte Procedures Fit Comfortably in the Due
Process Framework
One of the biggest flashpoints in the debate over extreme risk laws is
the possibility that property can be seized before the gun owner receives
notice or an opportunity to contest the order. All existing extreme risk
laws authorize this kind of initial, ex parte order, though such orders have
different burdens, procedures, and consequences than those issued after a
notice and full hearing.
Supporters argue that these ex parte proceedings are essential to
address crisis situations in which a gun owner poses an immediate risk of
harm to himself or others and yet is unavailable (perhaps because
unwilling) to appear in court.246 The availability of a prompt postdeprivation hearing means that the ex parte orders are only temporary and
of a relatively short duration. Opponents argue that ex parte orders are
particularly “Kafkaesque,” an endorsement of “the concept of stripping
Americans of their constitutional rights in secret proceedings where they
have no voice.”247 As one critic put it: “Someone can go to a judge,

direct the abuser to vacate her home, have no contact with the victim, or stay off certain
property.
Cheh, supra note 187, at 1405–06 (footnotes omitted). In addition to these reasons, states may
also wish to use other processes to avoid adding to the problems of mass incarceration.
245 Thomas Massie & John R. Lott Jr., ‘Red Flag’ Laws Are the Wrong Solution to Mass
Shootings, Nat’l Rev. (Aug. 12, 2019, 4:08 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/
2019/08/red-flag-laws-are-the-wrong-solution-to-mass-shootings/ [https://perma.cc/B6J2-5S
SS]. For a critique, see French, supra note 158 (“There is no ‘pre-crime’ conviction in
American law. You won’t face life in prison for homicidal ideation, but you might face an
injunction. . . . In some circumstances you should lose access to firearms for a limited period
of time. This is a reasonable response to evidence of a threat.”).
246 Yablon, supra note 59 (explaining the position of a GOP state representative from
Pennsylvania, who adopted every NRA-suggested edit to his extreme risk bill except the one
doing away with ex parte orders).
247
Hammond, supra note 93; see also Niño, supra note 57 (arguing that “due process rights
are turned upside down, as gun owners are presumed to be guilty and must then prove their
innocence”).
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declare you dangerous, and you won’t get a chance to defend yourself in
court.”248
But the real issue is not whether a gun owner will “get a chance to
defend [himself] in court” but when.249 And as the prior discussion
demonstrated, the Supreme Court has permitted these types of ex parte
orders in similar situations involving fundamental interests when
necessity requires quick action.
In keeping with the due process principles discussed above, existing
extreme risk laws tie the availability of ex parte relief to the types of harms
the Supreme Court and many other courts have recognized as allowing
deprivations prior to a full hearing. In Fuentes terms, the immediate
seizure is “directly necessary to secure an important governmental or
general public interest”;250 there is “a special need for very prompt action”
in this context;251 and no seizure can occur without approval of “a
government official responsible for determining, under the standards of a
narrowly drawn statute, that it [i]s necessary and justified in the particular
instance.”252 Another way to flesh this out is by looking to the three
factors Eldridge introduced: the individual interest, the risk of error, and
the government interest.253
Under the first Eldridge factor, the private interest in firearms
possession is undeniably important. Like the interests of parents in their
children and individuals in their freedom from confinement and freedom
of movement, gun possession is a fundamental constitutional right.
Still, the “hardship imposed upon”254 a gun owner by a temporary
deprivation should not be overstated. It is exceedingly unlikely that a
short-term ERPO will deprive a person of the ability to effectuate the
“core” Second Amendment interest in armed self-defense. Firearm use in
self-defense is rare,255 and it would be striking were such a need to arise
in the (up to) fourteen-day period that most ex parte ERPOs cover.

248

Bandlamudi, supra note 52 (quoting Paul Valone of Grass Roots North Carolina, a gun
rights advocacy group).
249 Id.
250 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90–92 (1972).
251 Id. at 91.
252 Id.
253 See supra notes 185–86 and accompanying text.
254 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 342 (1976).
255
Philip J. Cook & Kristin A. Goss, The Gun Debate: What Everyone Needs to Know 21
(2014) (“[T]here is one defensive gun use per year against an intruder for every 3,500 homes
that keep guns.”).
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Especially when a person is in the grips of a mental health crisis, or
otherwise presenting a risk to herself or others, the odds of a successful
self-defense action seem far lower than the odds of gun misuse. As Fred
Vars notes, “A person suffering from delusions or hallucinations cannot
be trusted to use a firearm defensively in an objectively reasonable
fashion.”256 Thus, although the private interest factor points in favor of
the gun owner, that factor should not be given undue weight.257
Under the second factor, the risks of an erroneous deprivation in the
context of a mistaken ex parte order are not entirely clear. Some evidence
suggests that not all ex parte orders turn into full, final ERPOs. A 2015
study of Indiana’s gun seizure law, focusing on 404 petitions filed
between 2006 and 2013, found that “seized firearms were retained by the
court at the initial hearing in 63% of cases; this retention was closely
linked to the defendant’s failure to appear at the hearing.” 258 Whether
there is a causal link, such that participation is important to avoid error, is
harder to say. A study of Connecticut’s law noted that of the 764 risk
warrants served between 1999 and 2013, firearms were returned to the
owner after the adversary hearing in only twenty cases, though
researchers noted that data was missing for approximately seventy
percent of the final outcomes.259
More fundamentally, it is not entirely clear how one would measure
whether initial ex parte orders are “erroneous.” Some have argued that the
ex parte orders have a high “error rate” because, as observed above, the
ERPO is not always maintained after the full hearing.260 But if the ERPO
256

Vars, supra note 8, at 1650.
This point becomes especially clear when comparing the potential harm to a gun owner,
from a temporary removal to the sometimes severe and long-term harms possible in other
situations where courts have sanctioned seizures prior to a hearing. See, e.g., Chill, supra note
218, at 459 (detailing the “range and extent of harm” from unnecessary removals of children
from their families, including psychological and financial harm, the potential for abuse in
foster homes, and additional stresses on an overworked system).
258 George F. Parker, Circumstances and Outcomes of a Firearm Seizure Law: Marion
County, Indiana, 2006–2013, 33 Behav. Sci. & L. 308, 308 (2015).
259 Norko & Baranoski, supra note 37, at 1618–19.
260 See Red Flag Laws: Examining Guidelines for State Action: Hearing before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 5 n.1 (2019) (statement of David B. Kopel),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Kopel%20Testimony1.pdf [https://perma.c
c/46CW-78CF] (stating that “[a]bout a third of gun confiscation orders are wrongly issued
against innocent people” based in part on a misreading of Norko and Baranoski’s article).
Compare this statement with other research. Swanson et al., supra note 72, at 193 (“Among
cases with known outcomes at hearing, results were as follows: guns held by police, sixty
percent; guns ordered destroyed or forfeited, fourteen percent; guns returned directly to the
257
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is not continued after the full hearing, perhaps it is because a true
emergency has abated. In that case, the ex parte order would have been
both necessary (and therefore properly issued) and a significantly lesser
burden than if a longer, more permanent ERPO was entered at the initial
stage. And, as Richard Fallon has observed, due process analysis has
taken on “a strikingly managerial aspect,” in which “[a]ttention
centers . . . on whether decisionmaking structures are adequate to
achieve, on average, a socially tolerable level of accuracy in the
application of law to fact.”261 Even if there will be erroneous decisions
that result in wrongly issued ERPOs in some number of cases, the focus
is on whether the framework creates a system that minimizes those
instances to an acceptable level.262
In this context, the “social disutility”263 of an incorrectly denied ERPO
will almost certainly outweigh that of an incorrectly granted one. A
temporary, fourteen-day deprivation of firearm rights is unlikely to result
in any physical harm or lasting damage, even if the court was wrong about
the risk. But if a court miscalculates and fails to grant an ERPO where
one is necessary, then permanent, irrevocable, and devastating
consequences can follow.264
Finally, under the third factor, the governmental and public interests
are undeniable, and are tied to the speed of the hearing. The situations in
which the Supreme Court has allowed the practice are precisely analogous
to the extreme risk context—where “quick action” is necessary to thwart
serious potential harm.265 Existing extreme risk laws only allow for
emergency, ex parte relief if the petitioner can plead and prove that such
quick action is necessary. In Delaware, for example, only law

subject, ten percent; guns transferred to another individual known to the subject and legally
eligible to possess guns, eight percent; other, eight percent.”); cf. also Hodel v. Va. Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 302 (1981) (remarking that erroneous decisions
do not undermine a law, because “[t]he relevant inquiry is not whether a cessation order should
have been issued in a particular case, but whether the statutory procedure itself is incapable of
affording due process”).
261 Fallon, supra note 169, at 311.
262 See Brown, supra note 8, at 197 (“Admittedly, mistakes can be made, and false
complaints can be filed, creating a slight chance of an erroneous deprivation. But this chance
of erroneous deprivation has existed since the creation of the first OFP statutes, because the
nature of domestic violence often requires immediate action.”).
263 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970).
264
See, e.g., Wintemute et al., supra note 79.
265 Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 539 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
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enforcement can initiate an emergency process to obtain an ERPO, and
they must allege (and prove) that the “respondent poses an immediate and
present danger of causing physical injury to [him]self or others by
controlling, purchasing, owning, possessing, controlling, purchasing,
having access to, or receiving a firearm.”266 Similarly, in Oregon, the
petitioner must prove that “the respondent presents a risk in the near
future, including an imminent risk, of suicide or of causing physical injury
to another person.”267 All other state laws permitting emergency relief are
similar.
In sum, the factors that have led courts to uphold civil commitment,
child custody removal, and restraining orders with no pre-deprivation
hearing support the practice of issuing ex parte ERPOs. But, just like in
those contexts, the person deprived of property is entitled to a prompt
post-deprivation hearing. Accordingly, the duration of ex parte orders in
extreme risk laws is limited. Only three states allow ex parte orders to stay
in place for more than two weeks.268 The rest are up to fourteen days or
less.269 By comparison, some states impose waiting periods on some kinds
of firearm purchases;270 to our knowledge, none have been struck down
as unconstitutional.271
The interest in having one’s firearms is significant, but the justification
for delay and the confirmation of judicial authorization all point to the
reasonableness of a short span of mere weeks before the final hearing.
Because there is such an overriding interest in getting the question right—
it could have profound and devastating effects—the ability of either the
State or a private petitioner to gather and marshal the evidence necessary
to make its case “counsels strongly against any constitutional imperative

266

Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 7703 (1974).
Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 166.527(6)(a) (West Supp. 2019).
268 Those three states are California, Delaware, and Oregon. For a helpful chart, see
Giffords Law Ctr. to Prevent Gun Violence, ERPO Procedures By State
https://lawcenter.giffords.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ERPO_Table_2-26-20.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/BK2W-U6S7] (last visited March 26, 2020).
269 Id.
270 Brian Burns, Holding Fire: Why Long Waiting Periods To Buy a Gun Violate the Second
Amendment, 7 Charleston L. Rev. 379, 399–400 (2013) (noting laws in eleven states).
271 See, e.g., Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816, 819 (9th Cir. 2016) (upholding California’s
ten-day waiting period for subsequent purchase). For an argument against the constitutionality
of even one-day periods, see Burns, supra note 270, at 410 (arguing that “longer waiting
periods—those extending beyond twenty-four hours—should be struck down as
unconstitutional”).
267
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that might require overly hasty decisionmaking.”272 Especially because a
judicial officer makes the initial determination with the burden of proof
on the petitioner, there is a lower likelihood of mistaken deprivations than
in many other contexts.273
B. The Standard of Proof
Another crucial question for the due process analysis is what burden
must be carried before a person is deprived of a legally protected
interest—what the standard of proof is, in other words. The government
cannot simply permit individuals or public officials to enter court, claim
a right to relief, and then transfer or confiscate property without putting
the claimant’s demand to the test.
The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the
Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to instruct the
factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he
should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular
type of adjudication.274

It also serves a symbolic function: “to indicate the relative importance
attached to the ultimate decision.”275 Justice Harlan described how the
burden of proof “reflect[s] an assessment of the comparative social
disutility of each” type of error—false positives and false negatives.276
Where we draw the line depends on the values at stake on both sides of
the ledger.
The focus of extreme risk laws is, as the name suggests, risk—that is,
they permit guns to be taken away upon a sufficient showing, from an
appropriate source, that a particular person is at risk of harming himself
or others. The constitutional (and for that matter political) questions
depend in large part on how that showing is structured, which in turn
generally depends on what kind of order is being sought. In California,
for example, a temporary emergency order can be issued if there is
“reasonable cause to believe” that the subject presents an “immediate and

272

Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 244 (1988).
See supra notes 258–60 and accompanying text.
274 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
275 Id.
276 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
273
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present danger” and that an emergency order is necessary,277 while an ex
parte order depends on a “substantial likelihood” of “a significant danger,
in the near future,”278 and a final (and lengthier) order depends on “clear
and convincing evidence” of “a significant danger.”279 These varying
standards of proof make it important to be precise about what kind of
order is at issue.
1. Principles for Establishing the Burden of Proof
Questions about the appropriate burden of proof arise both at the stage
of the temporary ex parte deprivation and when the full evidentiary
hearing occurs. At the initial stage, the Supreme Court has held that a law
satisfies due process when it requires the plaintiff to “satisfactorily
establish[] probable cause to believe” that the statutory criteria for
deprivation are satisfied.280 It has said, in the context of revoking a
driver’s license, that “due process require[s] only that the prerevocation
hearing involve a probable-cause determination as to the fault of the
licensee.”281 In other cases, it has described the burden at this initial stage
as requiring only “a substantial assurance that the deprivation is not
baseless or unwarranted.”282 That, as the phrase suggests, is a fairly low
standard.283
277

Cal. Penal Code §§ 18125, 18145 (Deering Supp. 2020).
Id. § 18150(b).
279 Id. § 18175.
280 Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64 (1979).
281 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (describing the holding in Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971)).
282 Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 240 (1988); see also Marentette v. City
of Canandaigua, 351 F. Supp. 3d 410, 427–28 (W.D.N.Y. 2019) (“[T]he substantial evidence
standard appears to be appropriately suited to serve as a preliminary check against baseless
administrative charges by ensuring that the record contains ‘reasonable grounds’ to support
the charges at issue.”).
283 Indeed, the standard can be met even without an independent, neutral arbiter reviewing
the evidence. See Spiegel v. Ryan, 946 F.2d 1435, 1440 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting requirement
for independent review and holding that an agency’s order imposing deprivation prior to a
hearing met the Mallen standard based on “a combination of factors: the [agency] was required
to meet specific statutory requirements before issuing the order, the decision to issue the order
was made by the head of the agency expert in these matters, and his decision was supported
by detailed findings of [the defendant’s] misconduct following a long investigation by the
[agency’s] examiners, the results of which were submitted to the district court under penalty
of perjury”); Jordan ex rel. Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 349 (4th Cir. 1994) (upholding
statute permitting child removal for up to seventy-two hours before even ex parte judicial
review could be obtained and stating that “[e]specially given the enormity of the potential
consequences of an erroneous return of a child to an abusive family, we cannot say that the
278
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Once the full evidentiary hearing occurs, the burden continues to rest
with the person seeking to continue the deprivation. What that final
burden should be is a function of the Eldridge calculus, under which the
court considers the private and public interests and the risk of error.284
The Supreme Court has also employed a special focus in answering
burden-of-proof questions, looking to factors such as “the nature of the
private interest at stake; the standard of proof applied by a majority of
states in that kind of case; the role of the state in the litigation; and the
nature of the issues to be decided in the proceeding.”285
When the individual interest is extremely strong, and the deprivation is
potentially permanent or indefinite, the Supreme Court has required a
heightened standard. The Court has, for instance, unanimously concluded
that due process requires a heightened standard before an individual can
be indefinitely confined in a mental hospital against their wishes. In
Addington v. Texas,286 the Court noted the continuum between the
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, used in ordinary civil cases
where only money is at issue, and the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
standard, used in criminal cases, where “the interests of the defendant are
of such magnitude that . . . they have been protected by standards of proof
designed to exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of an erroneous
judgment.”287 In between those two is the clear-and-convincing standard,
used for allegations of quasi-criminal wrongdoing (e.g., fraud) or when
“particularly important individual interests” are at stake.288
In Addington, the Court settled on the intermediate standard—clear and
convincing evidence.289 The individual interests were substantial,290 and
“[a]t one time or another every person exhibits some abnormal behavior
which might be perceived by some as symptomatic of a mental or
emotional disorder.”291 That could lead to erroneous results that weigh in
favor of a heightened standard. But the highest, beyond-a-reasonablerequirements of procedural due process demand more where a removal is effected shortly
before or during a weekend”); cf. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys. v. DLG Fin. Corp., 29
F.3d 993, 1002 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that the trial court ruling that the plaintiff had
presented “a prima facie showing” of its right to relief satisfied Mallen).
284 See supra notes 185–86 and accompanying text.
285 Wasserman, supra note 174, at 103–04.
286 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
287 Id. at 423.
288 Id. at 424.
289
Id. at 431–33.
290 Id. at 425–26.
291 Id. at 426.
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doubt standard was not warranted for at least three reasons: (1) the State
was not acting punitively, to punish the mentally ill, (2) that standard has
historically been confined to criminal contexts, and (3) the question at
issue in commitment contexts is not the same sort of straightforward
factual question at issue in criminal cases.292 On this last point, the Court
underscored the difficult assessment required here:
Whether the individual is mentally ill and dangerous to either himself
or others and is in need of confined therapy turns on the meaning of the
facts which must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists and
psychologists. Given the lack of certainty and the fallibility of
psychiatric diagnosis, there is a serious question as to whether a state
could ever prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual is both
mentally ill and likely to be dangerous.293

As a result, the intermediate standard best protected the competing
interests.
Likewise, the Court has mandated this heightened standard when
dealing with other significant private interests that can be deprived
permanently. In Santosky v. Kramer,294 it stated that “[b]efore a State may
sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural
child, due process requires that the State support its allegations by at least
clear and convincing evidence.”295 There again, however, the Court
recognized the sensitive and nuanced judgments that made requiring the
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard unwise.296 And it noted how the
majority of states considered the intermediate, clear-and-convincing
standard the most appropriate.297 Similarly, in Woodby v. INS,298 the Court
held that in deportation proceedings, the government must “establish the
facts supporting deportability by clear, unequivocal, and convincing
evidence.”299

292

Id. at 427–29.
Id. at 429.
294 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
295 Id. at 747–48.
296 Id. at 769 (“Like civil commitment hearings, termination proceedings often require the
factfinder to evaluate medical and psychiatric testimony, and to decide issues difficult to prove
to a level of absolute certainty, such as lack of parental motive, absence of affection between
parent and child, and failure of parental foresight and progress.”).
297
Id.
298 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
299 Id. at 277.
293
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2. The Burden of Proof in the Extreme Risk Context
The foregoing cases show that the Court has required heightened
standards of proof when important interests can be completely deprived.
But the Court has rejected calls to impose the highest burden in the civil
context, even for liberty interests the Court has described as the most
central and compelling.300 The question, then, is how the mix of
government and private interests affects the standard that should govern
at both stages of the inquiry of the ERPO process.
At the ex parte stage, a low standard that recognizes the potentially
catastrophic consequences of a wrong decision in failing to grant a
warranted ERPO makes the most sense. The imposition on the gun owner
is very short, and the requirement for judicial authorization minimizes
many of the possible harms. Nonetheless, as commentators note in the
domestic violence context, the potential for abuse makes it “incumbent
upon courts to treat orders of protection as they would any other request
for ex parte relief and ensure that relief be granted only when necessary
to prevent the risk of immediate and irreparable injury.”301
In current state laws, the most common standard of proof for ex parte
orders is reasonable, probable, or good cause of an imminent risk.302 In
four other states, the standard is preponderance of the evidence,303 and in
one (Oregon), the evidence must be clear and convincing.304 All of these
statutes require the decision to be made by a judicial officer.305 They
mirror the ex parte requirements in many domestic violence restraining
order statutes and other similar contexts.306 The convergence of states on

Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431 (1979) (“We conclude that it is unnecessary to
require states to apply the strict, criminal standard.”); Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769–70 (holding
that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard is not required for termination of parental rights).
301 Taylor et al., supra note 230, at 117.
302 Giffords, ERPO, supra note 53 (listing eleven states and the District of Columbia
employing this standard).
303 Id. (listing Colorado, Delaware, Nevada, and Vermont).
304 Id. This likely has to do with the fact that in Oregon, an ex parte order automatically
becomes final if not challenged by the respondent. Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 166.527(7)(f) (West
Supp. 2019) (specifying in the notice to a respondent that “[i]f you do not request a hearing,
the extreme risk protection order against you will be in effect for one year unless terminated
by the court”).
305 Zick, supra note 8 (explaining that state extreme risk laws “expressly require a judicial
order before removal of firearms”).
306
See, e.g., Taylor et al., supra note 230, at 118–33 (cataloguing state domestic violence
restraining order laws and showing standards for ex parte orders); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C261(b) (2019) (prescribing, in the civil commitment context, the “reasonable grounds”
300
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a fairly low standard of reasonable, probable, or good cause factors into
the conclusion that such a standard is permissible. These laws probably
satisfy the competing interests and implement the due process concerns
for fairness and flexibility at the ex parte stage, where courts have only
required substantial assurance that the decision was not unfounded or
arbitrary.307 As the Supreme Court itself has upheld statutes requiring just
“probable cause” at this stage, these procedures are likely adequate to pass
constitutional muster.308
As to the full ERPO, if the deprivation were permanent—and it is worth
emphasizing that it is not309—there is almost no question that the
considerations from Addington, Santosky, and Woodby would require use
of the clear-and-convincing standard. The fact that the deprivation is only
temporary—usually six months to a year, and subject to rescission—may
mitigate the concerns from those cases.
It is also abundantly clear that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard
is not required. An ERPO is not a criminal disposition, and the Supreme
Court has not extended that burden of proof outside the criminal (or
criminal-like juvenile adjudication) context. And all of the reasons the
Court adduced in Addington and Santosky to reject such a demanding
standard apply equally here as well. As there, the conclusion as to whether
an ERPO is warranted “turns on the meaning of the facts,” not simply
whether those facts exist.310 That makes it extremely unlikely that a
petitioner could meet the heavy burden demanded in a criminal
prosecution. Even the NRA does not argue for a reasonable doubt
threshold: “An order should only be granted when a judge makes the

standard to authorize law enforcement to take a dangerously mentally ill person into custody
for evaluation).
307 See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 240 (1988); see also Marentette v.
City of Canandaigua, 351 F. Supp. 3d 410, 427–28 (W.D.N.Y. 2019) (“[T]he substantial
evidence standard appears to be appropriately suited to serve as a preliminary check against
baseless administrative charges by ensuring that the record contains ‘reasonable grounds’ to
support the charges at issue.”).
308 See supra notes 280–81.
309 Some criticisms are predicated on the misunderstanding that ERPOs are permanent,
when in fact even a “final” order is time-limited. See, e.g., Dershowitz, supra note 109 (“Redflag laws would be worth trying as a remedy for gun violence if they remained limited to
temporary gun confiscation pending a timely due-process review.”).
310 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979).
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determination, by clear and convincing evidence, that the person poses a
significant risk of danger to themselves or others.”311
Beyond this fact, however, there are hard questions about the
constitutional minimum floor for the longer-term “final” orders. On the
one hand, the constitutional right to firearm possession is undeniably
fundamental. On the other, an erroneous denial can lead to no less
catastrophic consequences at this stage than at the ex parte one. There are
also questions not just about what the Constitution requires, but about best
practices for ensuring adequate protection for compelling interests on
both sides of the equation.312 The goal of this Article is not to bless or
condemn particular state statutes or adjudicate their varying burdens of
proof. But this Article does identify some considerations beyond the
compelling private interests that courts will likely consider when
confronting challenges to these laws.
First, courts will look to the standard of proof applied by most other
states. In twelve of the existing extreme risk laws, the standard of proof
for orders after the adversary hearing is clear and convincing evidence,
and it is preponderance of the evidence in five states and the District of
Columbia.313 Courts might also look to the analogous domestic violence
context, where many states permit entry of final orders of protection or
restraining orders if the plaintiff presents “reasonable grounds”314 to
support a claim or prove the case by a “preponderance of the evidence.”315
As more states adopt extreme risk laws, the burdens they employ will
inform the constitutional calculus.
Second, courts will consider the role of the State in the proceeding. In
some extreme risk laws, petitions are filed and orders are sought by
311 Emergency
Risk Protection Orders (ERPOs), NRA-ILA (Jan. 8, 2019),
https://www.nraila.org/get-the-facts/emergency-risk-protection-orders-erpos/ [https://perma.
cc/6P2R-CJ9S].
312 For example, Colorado’s extreme risk law provides the right to counsel for ERPO
respondents, even though the Supreme Court has not held that the Constitution mandates the
right to an attorney in civil cases. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-14.5-103(6)(g) (2019) (stating that a
respondent must be informed that “[a]n attorney will be appointed to represent you, or you
may seek the advice of your own attorney at your own expense as to any matter connected
with this order”).
313 Giffords, ERPO, supra note 53.
314 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 813.12(4)(a)3 (2017–18); see also Fla. Stat. § 741.30(6)(a) (2019)
(“Upon notice and hearing, when it appears to the court that the petitioner is either the victim
of domestic violence as defined by s. 741.28 or has reasonable cause to believe he or she is in
imminent danger of becoming a victim of domestic violence, the court may grant such relief
as the court deems proper, including an injunction . . . .”).
315 See, e.g., 23 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6107(a) (West 2019).
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government officials.316 In others, private individuals who stand in some
special relationship to the respondent are allowed to petition without prior
intervention from the State.317 Where the State is the actor involved,
courts may require other procedural safeguards to balance the power, such
as appointment of counsel (as Colorado’s extreme risk law provides)318
or other levers of support to ensure the respondent’s rights are adequately
protected. Or they might mandate that the State meet a higher burden of
proof than an ordinary private litigant seeking money damages in a civil
suit.
Finally, courts will look to the nature of the proceedings, including the
possibilities for error. Like hearings over the danger a child faces from
allegedly abusive parents or the danger a mentally ill individual poses to
himself or others, extreme risk proceedings turn on complex and nuanced
judgments about concepts for which we lack perfectly predictive
scientific evidence. As noted above, this notion points away from a
demanding burden of proof that would make it impossible to vindicate the
government’s compelling interest in public safety. And the possibility of
an erroneous deprivation—while real and important—is no less
substantial than the risk of an erroneous denial that leads to injury or
death.319
CONCLUSION
Thus far, no court has declared an extreme risk law unconstitutional on
any grounds.320 But the debates about extreme risk laws are likely just
beginning, in legislatures, in scholarly discourse, and in courts. And those
debates will be largely driven—both as a matter of policy and
constitutional law—by considerations of what due process requires. Some
experts, for example, have argued that “state red flag laws are generally
consistent with procedural fairness” because they impose the burden on
the petitioner, guarantee judicial oversight, and provide a prompt hearing
316

E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-38c(a) (2019).
E.g., Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 5-601(e)(2) (LexisNexis 2018).
318 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-14.5-103(6)(g) (2019) (detailing the requirements for a temporary
order, including notice to the respondent that for the hearing “[a]n attorney will be appointed
to represent you, or you may seek the advice of your own attorney at your own expense as to
any matter connected with this order”).
319 See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
320
See Foster, supra note 65; see also Caroline Shen, Note, A Triggered Nation: An
Argument for Extreme Risk Protection Orders, 46 Hastings Const. L.Q. 683, 692–711 (2019)
(canvassing relevant case law from across federal circuits).
317
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that focuses on risk.321 Courts considering challenges to extreme risk laws
so far have upheld them against Second Amendment and other claims,322
and a Florida appeals court also recently rejected a due process claim. In
Davis v. Gilchrist County Sheriff’s Office,323 the man who had a risk
protection order entered against him claimed, among other things, that
Florida’s entire extreme risk statute was unconstitutional. Although the
court characterized part of his challenge as a “substantive due process”
challenge, it spoke in terms that sound also in procedural due process
when upholding the law:
The statute . . . requires a hearing within fourteen days of a[] [risk
protection order] petition being filed, thus affording a respondent due
process and a prompt opportunity to resist a final order. Moreover, the
statute incorporates an added due process safeguard by requiring
proponents to meet the heightened “clear and convincing” burden of
proof standard. Furthermore, the duration of the RPO may not exceed
twelve months, and the statute contains a mechanism whereby the
respondent can request early termination of the order. Finally, the
statute clearly requires the listed factors be considered within a specific
context—the threat of gun violence.324

Because of these protections, the court rejected the constitutional
challenge.325
As extreme risk laws continue to spread, further constitutional
challenges will undoubtedly follow. Our goal in this Article has been to
illustrate the fundamental questions of due process that will be central to
those challenges—and thus to the future of gun rights and regulation.

321

Zick, supra note 8.
See, e.g., Hope v. State, 133 A.3d 519, 524–25 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016); Redington v.
State, 992 N.E.2d 823, 830–39 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
323
280 So. 3d 524 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019).
324 Id. at 533 (citations omitted).
325 Id.
322

